Remove redundant work_backlog_mutex #1

congwang · 2024-11-20T22:21:04Z

No description provided.

The dtl_access_lock needs to be a rw_sempahore, a sleeping lock, because the code calls kmalloc() while holding it, which can sleep: # echo 1 > /proc/powerpc/vcpudispatch_stats BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:337 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 199, name: sh preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 3 locks held by sh/199: #0: c00000000a0743f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x324/0x438 #1: c0000000028c7058 (dtl_enable_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vcpudispatch_stats_write+0xd4/0x5f4 #2: c0000000028c70b8 (dtl_access_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: vcpudispatch_stats_write+0x220/0x5f4 CPU: 0 PID: 199 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4 torvalds#152 Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x130/0x148 (unreliable) __might_resched+0x174/0x410 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x340/0x3d0 alloc_dtl_buffers+0x124/0x1ac vcpudispatch_stats_write+0x2a8/0x5f4 proc_reg_write+0xf4/0x150 vfs_write+0xfc/0x438 ksys_write+0x88/0x148 system_call_exception+0x1c4/0x5a0 system_call_common+0xf4/0x258 Fixes: 06220d7 ("powerpc/pseries: Introduce rwlock to gatekeep DTLB usage") Tested-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nysal Jan K.A <nysal@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819122401.513203-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au

commit 011e5f5 ("arm64/cpufeature: Add remaining feature bits in ID_AA64PFR0 register") exposed the MPAM field of AA64PFR0_EL1 to guests, but didn't add trap handling. If you are unlucky, this results in an MPAM aware guest being delivered an undef during boot. The host prints: | kvm [97]: Unsupported guest sys_reg access at: ffff800080024c64 [00000005] | { Op0( 3), Op1( 0), CRn(10), CRm( 5), Op2( 0), func_read }, Which results in: | Internal error: Oops - Undefined instruction: 0000000002000000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc7-00559-gd89c186d50b2 #14616 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : test_has_mpam+0x18/0x30 | lr : test_has_mpam+0x10/0x30 | sp : ffff80008000bd90 ... | Call trace: | test_has_mpam+0x18/0x30 | update_cpu_capabilities+0x7c/0x11c | setup_cpu_features+0x14/0xd8 | smp_cpus_done+0x24/0xb8 | smp_init+0x7c/0x8c | kernel_init_freeable+0xf8/0x280 | kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | Code: 910003fd 97ffffde 72001c00 54000080 (d538a500) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b | ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- Add the support to enable the traps, and handle the three guest accessible registers by injecting an UNDEF. This stops KVM from spamming the host log, but doesn't yet hide the feature from the id registers. With MPAM v1.0 we can trap the MPAMIDR_EL1 register only if ARM64_HAS_MPAM_HCR, with v1.1 an additional MPAM2_EL2.TIDR bit traps MPAMIDR_EL1 on platforms that don't have MPAMHCR_EL2. Enable one of these if either is supported. If neither is supported, the guest can discover that the CPU has MPAM support, and how many PARTID etc the host has ... but it can't influence anything, so its harmless. Fixes: 011e5f5 ("arm64/cpufeature: Add remaining feature bits in ID_AA64PFR0 register") CC: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200925160102.118858-1-james.morse@arm.com/ Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> Tested-by: Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241030160317.2528209-5-joey.gouly@arm.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>

Patch series "page allocation tag compression", v4. This patchset implements several improvements: 1. Gracefully handles module unloading while there are used allocations allocated from that module; 2. Provides an option to store page allocation tag references in the page flags, removing dependency on page extensions and eliminating the memory overhead from storing page allocation references (~0.2% of total system memory). This also improves page allocation performance when CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING is enabled by eliminating page extension lookup. Page allocation performance overhead is reduced from 41% to 5.5%. Patch #1 introduces mas_for_each_rev() helper function. Patch #2 introduces shutdown_mem_profiling() helper function to be used when disabling memory allocation profiling. Patch #3 copies module tags into virtually contiguous memory which serves two purposes: - Lets us deal with the situation when module is unloaded while there are still live allocations from that module. Since we are using a copy version of the tags we can safely unload the module. Space and gaps in this contiguous memory are managed using a maple tree. - Enables simple indexing of the tags in the later patches. Patch #4 changes the way we allocate virtually contiguous memory for module tags to reserve only vitrual area and populate physical pages only as needed at module load time. Patch #5 abstracts page allocation tag reference to simplify later changes. Patch torvalds#6 adds compression option to the sysctl.vm.mem_profiling boot parameter for storing page allocation tag references inside page flags if they fit. If the number of available page flag bits is insufficient to address all kernel allocations, memory allocation profiling gets disabled with an appropriate warning. This patch (of 6): Add mas_for_each_rev() function to iterate maple tree nodes in reverse order. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241023170759.999909-1-surenb@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241023170759.999909-2-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Suggested-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Sourav Panda <souravpanda@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Xiongwei Song <xiongwei.song@windriver.com> Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

…l/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 changes for 6.13, part #1 - Support for stage-1 permission indirection (FEAT_S1PIE) and permission overlays (FEAT_S1POE), including nested virt + the emulated page table walker - Introduce PSCI SYSTEM_OFF2 support to KVM + client driver. This call was introduced in PSCIv1.3 as a mechanism to request hibernation, similar to the S4 state in ACPI - Explicitly trap + hide FEAT_MPAM (QoS controls) from KVM guests. As part of it, introduce trivial initialization of the host's MPAM context so KVM can use the corresponding traps - PMU support under nested virtualization, honoring the guest hypervisor's trap configuration and event filtering when running a nested guest - Fixes to vgic ITS serialization where stale device/interrupt table entries are not zeroed when the mapping is invalidated by the VM - Avoid emulated MMIO completion if userspace has requested synchronous external abort injection - Various fixes and cleanups affecting pKVM, vCPU initialization, and selftests

…tration Move pkey change work initialization and cleanup from device resources stage to notifier stage, since this is the stage which handles this work events. Fix a race between the device deregistration and pkey change work by moving MLX5_IB_STAGE_DEVICE_NOTIFIER to be after MLX5_IB_STAGE_IB_REG in order to ensure that the notifier is deregistered before the device during cleanup. Which ensures there are no works that are being executed after the device has already unregistered which can cause the panic below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 630071 Comm: kworker/1:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W OE --------- --- 5.14.0-162.6.1.el9_1.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 02/27/2023 Workqueue: events pkey_change_handler [mlx5_ib] RIP: 0010:setup_qp+0x38/0x1f0 [mlx5_ib] Code: ee 41 54 45 31 e4 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 20 8b 77 08 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 48 8b 07 48 8d 4c 24 16 <4c> 8b 38 49 8b 87 80 0b 00 00 4c 89 ff 48 8b 80 08 05 00 00 8b 40 RSP: 0018:ffffbcc54068be20 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff954054494128 RCX: ffffbcc54068be36 RDX: ffff954004934000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff954054494128 RBP: 0000000000000023 R08: ffff954001be2c20 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff954001be2c20 R11: ffff9540260133c0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000023 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9540ffcb0905 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9540ffc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010625c001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: mlx5_ib_gsi_pkey_change+0x20/0x40 [mlx5_ib] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 kthread+0x149/0x170 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx_compat(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) tls knem(OE) netconsole nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs qrtr rfkill sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common rapl hv_balloon hv_utils i2c_piix4 pcspkr joydev fuse ext4 mbcache jbd2 sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg ata_generic pci_hyperv pci_hyperv_intf hyperv_drm drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper hv_storvsc syscopyarea hv_netvsc sysfillrect sysimgblt hid_hyperv fb_sys_fops scsi_transport_fc hyperv_keyboard drm ata_piix crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel libata ghash_clmulni_intel hv_vmbus serio_raw [last unloaded: ib_core] CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace f6f8be4eae12f7bc ]--- Fixes: 7722f47 ("IB/mlx5: Create GSI transmission QPs when P_Key table is changed") Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <phaddad@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/d271ceeff0c08431b3cbbbb3e2d416f09b6d1621.1731496944.git.leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>

In kunit_debugfs_create_suite(), if alloc_string_stream() fails in the kunit_suite_for_each_test_case() loop, the "suite->log = stream" has assigned before, and the error path only free the suite->log's stream memory but not set it to NULL, so the later string_stream_clear() of suite->log in kunit_init_suite() will cause below UAF bug. Set stream pointer to NULL after free to fix it. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006440150000030d Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [006440150000030d] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: iio_test_gts industrialio_gts_helper cfg80211 rfkill ipv6 [last unloaded: iio_test_gts] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 6253 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W N 6.12.0-rc4+ torvalds#458 Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [N]=TEST Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : string_stream_clear+0x54/0x1ac lr : string_stream_clear+0x1a8/0x1ac sp : ffffffc080b47410 x29: ffffffc080b47410 x28: 006440550000030d x27: ffffff80c96b5e98 x26: ffffff80c96b5e80 x25: ffffffe461b3f6c0 x24: 0000000000000003 x23: ffffff80c96b5e88 x22: 1ffffff019cdf4fc x21: dfffffc000000000 x20: ffffff80ce6fa7e0 x19: 032202a80000186d x18: 0000000000001840 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffffe45c355cb4 x14: ffffffe45c35589c x13: ffffffe45c03da78 x12: ffffffb810168e75 x11: 1ffffff810168e74 x10: ffffffb810168e74 x9 : dfffffc000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffffffc080b473a0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffffe462fbf620 x0 : dfffffc000000000 Call trace: string_stream_clear+0x54/0x1ac __kunit_test_suites_init+0x108/0x1d8 kunit_exec_run_tests+0xb8/0x100 kunit_module_notify+0x400/0x55c notifier_call_chain+0xfc/0x3b4 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x68/0x9c do_init_module+0x24c/0x5c8 load_module+0x4acc/0x4e90 init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128 idempotent_init_module+0x2d4/0x57c __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x100 invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c el0_svc+0x48/0xb8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: f9400753 d2dff800 f2fbffe0 d343fe7c (38e06b80) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112080314.407966-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a3fdf78 ("kunit: string-stream: Decouple string_stream from kunit") Suggested-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

open_cached_dir() may either race with the tcon reconnection even before compound_send_recv() or directly trigger a reconnection via SMB2_open_init() or SMB_query_info_init(). The reconnection process invokes invalidate_all_cached_dirs() via cifs_mark_open_files_invalid(), which removes all cfids from the cfids->entries list but doesn't drop a ref if has_lease isn't true. This results in the currently-being-constructed cfid not being on the list, but still having a refcount of 2. It leaks if returned from open_cached_dir(). Fix this by setting cfid->has_lease when the ref is actually taken; the cfid will not be used by other threads until it has a valid time. Addresses these kmemleaks: unreferenced object 0xffff8881090c4000 (size 1024): comm "bash", pid 1860, jiffies 4295126592 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de ........"....... 00 ca 45 22 81 88 ff ff f8 dc 4f 04 81 88 ff ff ..E"......O..... backtrace (crc 6f58c20f): [<ffffffff8b895a1e>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2be/0x350 [<ffffffff8bda06e3>] open_cached_dir+0x993/0x1fb0 [<ffffffff8bdaa750>] cifs_readdir+0x15a0/0x1d50 [<ffffffff8b9a853f>] iterate_dir+0x28f/0x4b0 [<ffffffff8b9a9aed>] __x64_sys_getdents64+0xfd/0x200 [<ffffffff8cf6da05>] do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8d00012f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e unreferenced object 0xffff8881044fdcf8 (size 8): comm "bash", pid 1860, jiffies 4295126592 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ backtrace (crc 10c106a9): [<ffffffff8b89a3d3>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x363/0x480 [<ffffffff8b7d7256>] kstrdup+0x36/0x60 [<ffffffff8bda0700>] open_cached_dir+0x9b0/0x1fb0 [<ffffffff8bdaa750>] cifs_readdir+0x15a0/0x1d50 [<ffffffff8b9a853f>] iterate_dir+0x28f/0x4b0 [<ffffffff8b9a9aed>] __x64_sys_getdents64+0xfd/0x200 [<ffffffff8cf6da05>] do_syscall_64+0x95/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8d00012f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e And addresses these BUG splats when unmounting the SMB filesystem: BUG: Dentry ffff888140590ba0{i=1000000000080,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3433 at fs/dcache.c:1536 umount_check+0xd0/0x100 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3433 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-g850925a8133c-dirty torvalds#49 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 RIP: 0010:umount_check+0xd0/0x100 Code: 8d 7c 24 40 e8 31 5a f4 ff 49 8b 54 24 40 41 56 49 89 e9 45 89 e8 48 89 d9 41 57 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 80 e7 db ac e8 f0 72 9a ff <0f> 0b 58 31 c0 5a 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 2b e5 5d 01 41 RSP: 0018:ffff88811cc27978 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888140590ba0 RCX: ffffffffaaf20bae RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff8881f6fb6f40 RBP: ffff8881462ec000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1023984ee3 R10: ffff88811cc2771f R11: 00000000016cfcc0 R12: ffff888134383e08 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff8881462ec668 R15: ffffffffaceab4c0 FS: 00007f23bfa98740(0000) GS:ffff8881f6f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556de4a6f808 CR3: 0000000123c80000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> d_walk+0x6a/0x530 shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x6a/0x200 generic_shutdown_super+0x52/0x2a0 kill_anon_super+0x22/0x40 cifs_kill_sb+0x159/0x1e0 deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0 cleanup_mnt+0x140/0x210 task_work_run+0xfb/0x170 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x29f/0x2b0 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f23bfb93ae7 Code: ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 0d 11 93 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 50 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e9 92 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffee9138598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000050 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000558f1803e9a0 RCX: 00007f23bfb93ae7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000558f1803e9a0 RBP: 0000558f1803e600 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000558f17fab610 R10: d91d5ec34ab757b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> irq event stamp: 1163486 hardirqs last enabled at (1163485): [<ffffffffac98d344>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x34/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (1163486): [<ffffffffac97dcfc>] __schedule+0xc7c/0x19a0 softirqs last enabled at (1163482): [<ffffffffab79a3ee>] __smb_send_rqst+0x3de/0x990 softirqs last disabled at (1163480): [<ffffffffac2314f1>] release_sock+0x21/0xf0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of cifs (cifs) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:661! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 3433 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc4-g850925a8133c-dirty torvalds#49 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 RIP: 0010:generic_shutdown_super+0x290/0x2a0 Code: e8 15 7c f7 ff 48 8b 5d 28 48 89 df e8 09 7c f7 ff 48 8b 0b 48 89 ee 48 8d 95 68 06 00 00 48 c7 c7 80 7f db ac e8 00 69 af ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffff88811cc27a50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: ffffffffae994420 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffab06180e RDI: ffff8881f6eb18c8 RBP: ffff8881462ec000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed103edd6319 R10: ffff8881f6eb18cb R11: 00000000016d3158 R12: ffff8881462ec9c0 R13: ffff8881462ec050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f23bfa98740(0000) GS:ffff8881f6e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8364005d68 CR3: 0000000123c80000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> kill_anon_super+0x22/0x40 cifs_kill_sb+0x159/0x1e0 deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0 cleanup_mnt+0x140/0x210 task_work_run+0xfb/0x170 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x29f/0x2b0 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f23bfb93ae7 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:generic_shutdown_super+0x290/0x2a0 Code: e8 15 7c f7 ff 48 8b 5d 28 48 89 df e8 09 7c f7 ff 48 8b 0b 48 89 ee 48 8d 95 68 06 00 00 48 c7 c7 80 7f db ac e8 00 69 af ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffff88811cc27a50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: ffffffffae994420 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffab06180e RDI: ffff8881f6eb18c8 RBP: ffff8881462ec000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed103edd6319 R10: ffff8881f6eb18cb R11: 00000000016d3158 R12: ffff8881462ec9c0 R13: ffff8881462ec050 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f23bfa98740(0000) GS:ffff8881f6e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8364005d68 CR3: 0000000123c80000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 This reproduces eventually with an SMB mount and two shells running these loops concurrently - while true; do cd ~; sleep 1; for i in {1..3}; do cd /mnt/test/subdir; echo $PWD; sleep 1; cd ..; echo $PWD; sleep 1; done; echo ...; done - while true; do iptables -F OUTPUT; mount -t cifs -a; for _ in {0..2}; do ls /mnt/test/subdir/ | wc -l; done; iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 445 -j DROP; sleep 10 echo "unmounting"; umount -l -t cifs -a; echo "done unmounting"; sleep 20 echo "recovering"; iptables -F OUTPUT; sleep 10; done Fixes: ebe98f1 ("cifs: enable caching of directories for which a lease is held") Fixes: 5c86919 ("smb: client: fix use-after-free in smb2_query_info_compound()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Aurich <paul@darkrain42.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

Jordy says: " In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer (map->max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer (k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value for map->max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check: if (k >= map->max_entries) return -EINVAL; This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2), which is then used as an array index in m->xsk_map[k], which results in an out-of-bounds access. spin_lock_bh(&m->lock); map_entry = &m->xsk_map[k]; // Out-of-bounds map_entry old_xs = unrcu_pointer(xchg(map_entry, NULL)); // Oob write if (old_xs) xsk_map_sock_delete(old_xs, map_entry); spin_unlock_bh(&m->lock); The xchg operation can then be used to cause an out-of-bounds write. Moreover, the invalid map_entry passed to xsk_map_sock_delete can lead to further memory corruption. " It indeed results in following splat: [76612.897343] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2e461108 [76612.904330] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [76612.909639] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [76612.914855] PGD 0 P4D 0 [76612.917431] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [76612.921859] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 10318 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ torvalds#470 [76612.929189] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [76612.939781] RIP: 0010:xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60 [76612.944738] Code: 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 63 2e 3b 6f 24 73 38 4c 8d a7 f8 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 2d bf 05 00 48 8d b4 eb 00 01 00 00 31 ff <48> 87 3e 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 16 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 3e bc 05 00 31 [76612.963774] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002e407df8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [76612.969079] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9002e461000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [76612.976323] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc8fc2e461108 RDI: 0000000000000000 [76612.983569] RBP: ffffffff80000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000007 [76612.990812] R10: ffffc9002e407e18 R11: ffff888108a38858 R12: ffffc9002e4610f8 [76612.998060] R13: ffff888108a38858 R14: 00007ffd1ae0ac78 R15: ffffc9002e4610c0 [76613.005303] FS: 00007f80b6f59740(0000) GS:ffff8897e0ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [76613.013517] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [76613.019349] CR2: ffffc8fc2e461108 CR3: 000000011e3ef001 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [76613.026595] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [76613.033841] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [76613.041086] PKRU: 55555554 [76613.043842] Call Trace: [76613.046331] <TASK> [76613.048468] ? __die+0x20/0x60 [76613.051581] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450 [76613.055747] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30 [76613.059649] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 [76613.063988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140 [76613.067975] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [76613.072229] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60 [76613.076573] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x23/0x60 [76613.080914] __sys_bpf+0x19b7/0x23c0 [76613.084555] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x20 [76613.088194] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0 [76613.091832] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [76613.096962] RIP: 0033:0x7f80b6d1e88d [76613.100592] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [76613.119631] RSP: 002b:00007ffd1ae0ac68 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 [76613.131330] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f80b6d1e88d [76613.142632] RDX: 0000000000000098 RSI: 00007ffd1ae0ad20 RDI: 0000000000000003 [76613.153967] RBP: 00007ffd1ae0adc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [76613.166030] R10: 00007f80b6f77040 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd1ae0aed8 [76613.177130] R13: 000055ddf42ce1e9 R14: 000055ddf42d0d98 R15: 00007f80b6fab040 [76613.188129] </TASK> Fix this by simply changing key type from int to u32. Fixes: fbfc504 ("bpf: introduce new bpf AF_XDP map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241122121030.716788-2-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Jordy reported issue against XSKMAP which also applies to DEVMAP - the index used for accessing map entry, due to being a signed integer, causes the OOB writes. Fix is simple as changing the type from int to u32, however, when compared to XSKMAP case, one more thing needs to be addressed. When map is released from system via dev_map_free(), we iterate through all of the entries and an iterator variable is also an int, which implies OOB accesses. Again, change it to be u32. Example splat below: [ 160.724676] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2c001000 [ 160.731662] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 160.736876] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 160.742095] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 160.744678] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 160.749106] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: kworker/u145:12 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ torvalds#487 [ 160.757050] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [ 160.767642] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred [ 160.773308] RIP: 0010:dev_map_free+0x77/0x170 [ 160.777735] Code: 00 e8 fd 91 ed ff e8 b8 73 ed ff 41 83 7d 18 19 74 6e 41 8b 45 24 49 8b bd f8 00 00 00 31 db 85 c0 74 48 48 63 c3 48 8d 04 c7 <48> 8b 28 48 85 ed 74 30 48 8b 7d 18 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 b3 52 fa ff [ 160.796777] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ee1fe38 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 160.802086] RAX: ffffc8fc2c001000 RBX: 0000000080000000 RCX: 0000000000000024 [ 160.809331] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000024 RDI: ffffc9002c001000 [ 160.816576] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000023 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 160.823823] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000ee6b2 R12: dead000000000122 [ 160.831066] R13: ffff88810c928e00 R14: ffff8881002df405 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 160.838310] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8897e0c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 160.846528] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 160.852357] CR2: ffffc8fc2c001000 CR3: 0000000005c32006 CR4: 00000000007726f0 [ 160.859604] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 160.866847] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 160.874092] PKRU: 55555554 [ 160.876847] Call Trace: [ 160.879338] <TASK> [ 160.881477] ? __die+0x20/0x60 [ 160.884586] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450 [ 160.888746] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30 [ 160.892647] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 [ 160.896988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140 [ 160.900973] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 160.905232] ? dev_map_free+0x77/0x170 [ 160.909043] ? dev_map_free+0x58/0x170 [ 160.912857] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x51/0x90 [ 160.917196] process_one_work+0x142/0x370 [ 160.921272] worker_thread+0x29e/0x3b0 [ 160.925082] ? rescuer_thread+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 160.929157] kthread+0xd4/0x110 [ 160.932355] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [ 160.936079] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ 160.943396] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [ 160.950803] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 160.958482] </TASK> Fixes: 546ac1f ("bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241122121030.716788-3-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

…ode. creating a large files during checkpoint disable until it runs out of space and then delete it, then remount to enable checkpoint again, and then unmount the filesystem triggers the f2fs_bug_on as below: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:896! CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1286 Comm: umount Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-dirty torvalds#360 Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x58c/0x610 Call Trace: __die_body+0x15/0x60 die+0x33/0x50 do_trap+0x10a/0x120 f2fs_evict_inode+0x58c/0x610 do_error_trap+0x60/0x80 f2fs_evict_inode+0x58c/0x610 exc_invalid_op+0x53/0x60 f2fs_evict_inode+0x58c/0x610 asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 f2fs_evict_inode+0x58c/0x610 evict+0x101/0x260 dispose_list+0x30/0x50 evict_inodes+0x140/0x190 generic_shutdown_super+0x2f/0x150 kill_block_super+0x11/0x40 kill_f2fs_super+0x7d/0x140 deactivate_locked_super+0x2a/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0xb3/0x140 task_work_run+0x61/0x90 The root cause is: creating large files during disable checkpoint period results in not enough free segments, so when writing back root inode will failed in f2fs_enable_checkpoint. When umount the file system after enabling checkpoint, the root inode is dirty in f2fs_evict_inode function, which triggers BUG_ON. The steps to reproduce are as follows: dd if=/dev/zero of=f2fs.img bs=1M count=55 mount f2fs.img f2fs_dir -o checkpoint=disable:10% dd if=/dev/zero of=big bs=1M count=50 sync rm big mount -o remount,checkpoint=enable f2fs_dir umount f2fs_dir Let's redirty inode when there is not free segments during checkpoint is disable. Signed-off-by: Qi Han <hanqi@vivo.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

For the current debugfs of hisi_sas, after user triggers dump, the driver allocate memory space to save the register information and create debugfs files to display the saved information. In this process, the debugfs files created after each dump. Therefore, when the dump is triggered while the driver is unbind, the following hang occurs: [67840.853907] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0 [67840.862947] Mem abort info: [67840.865855] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [67840.869713] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [67840.875125] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [67840.878291] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [67840.881545] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [67840.886528] Data abort info: [67840.889524] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [67840.895117] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [67840.900284] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [67840.905709] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000002803a1f000 [67840.912263] [00000000000000a0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [67840.919177] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [67840.996435] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [67841.003628] pc : down_write+0x30/0x98 [67841.007546] lr : start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198 [67841.012495] sp : ffff8000b979ba20 [67841.016046] x29: ffff8000b979ba20 x28: 0000000000000010 x27: 0000000000024b40 [67841.023412] x26: 0000000000000012 x25: ffff20202b355ae8 x24: ffff20202b35a8c8 [67841.030779] x23: ffffa36877928208 x22: ffffa368b4972240 x21: ffff8000b979bb18 [67841.038147] x20: ffff00281dc1e3c0 x19: fffffffffffffffe x18: 0000000000000020 [67841.045515] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa368b128a530 x15: ffffffffffffffff [67841.052888] x14: ffff8000b979bc18 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: ffff8000b979bb18 [67841.060263] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffa368b1289b18 [67841.067640] x8 : 0000000000000012 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000000003a9 [67841.075014] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff002818c5cb00 x3 : 0000000000000001 [67841.082388] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff002818c5cb00 x0 : 00000000000000a0 [67841.089759] Call trace: [67841.092456] down_write+0x30/0x98 [67841.096017] start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198 [67841.100613] debugfs_create_dir+0x48/0x1f8 [67841.104950] debugfs_create_files_v3_hw+0x88/0x348 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.111447] debugfs_snapshot_regs_v3_hw+0x708/0x798 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.118111] debugfs_trigger_dump_v3_hw_write+0x9c/0x120 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.125115] full_proxy_write+0x68/0xc8 [67841.129175] vfs_write+0xd8/0x3f0 [67841.132708] ksys_write+0x70/0x108 [67841.136317] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 [67841.140440] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 [67841.144385] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 [67841.149273] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [67841.152773] el0_svc+0x38/0xd8 [67841.156009] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8 [67841.160361] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 [67841.164189] Code: b9000882 d2800002 d2800023 f9800011 (c85ffc05) [67841.170443] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- To fix this issue, create all directories and files during debugfs initialization. In this way, the driver only needs to allocate memory space to save information each time the user triggers dumping. Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <liyihang9@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008021822.2617339-13-liyihang9@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xingui Yang <yangxingui@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc7088 ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5 ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot torvalds#12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4bfd4c0e976c1776cd08e76603903b338cf25729.1728579288.git.lukas@wunner.de Reported-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg@secunet.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6de4b45ff2b32dd91a805ec02ec8ec73ef411bf6.camel@secunet.com/ Tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

This patch adds per-device stats in debugfs, the examples are as below: mkfs.f2fs -f -c /dev/vdc /dev/vdb mount /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/f2fs/status Multidevice stats: [seg: inuse dirty full free prefree] #0 5 0 0 4007 0 #1 1 0 0 8191 0 mkfs.f2fs -f -s 2 -c /dev/vdc /dev/vdb mount /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs cat /sys/kernel/debug/f2fs/status Multidevice stats: [seg: inuse dirty full free prefree] [sec: inuse dirty full free prefree] #0 5 0 0 4005 0 5 0 0 2000 0 #1 1 0 0 8191 0 1 0 0 4095 0 Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

syzbot reports deadlock issue of f2fs as below: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-rc3-syzkaller-00087-gc964ced77262 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/79 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888011824088 (&sbi->sb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_down_write fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2199 [inline] ffff888011824088 (&sbi->sb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_record_stop_reason+0x52/0x1d0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4068 but task is already holding lock: ffff88804bd92610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: f2fs_evict_inode+0x662/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:842 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1716 [inline] sb_start_intwrite+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs.h:1899 f2fs_evict_inode+0x662/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:842 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 f2fs_evict_inode+0x1a4/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:807 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 dispose_list fs/inode.c:774 [inline] prune_icache_sb+0x239/0x2f0 fs/inode.c:963 super_cache_scan+0x38c/0x4b0 fs/super.c:223 do_shrink_slab+0x701/0x1160 mm/shrinker.c:435 shrink_slab+0x1093/0x14d0 mm/shrinker.c:662 shrink_one+0x43b/0x850 mm/vmscan.c:4818 shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4879 [inline] lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:4957 [inline] shrink_node+0x3799/0x3de0 mm/vmscan.c:5937 kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6765 [inline] balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6957 [inline] kswapd+0x1ca3/0x3700 mm/vmscan.c:7226 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:3834 [inline] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x88/0x130 mm/page_alloc.c:3848 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:318 [inline] prepare_alloc_pages+0x147/0x5b0 mm/page_alloc.c:4493 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x16f/0x710 mm/page_alloc.c:4722 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x3e8/0x680 mm/mempolicy.c:2265 alloc_pages_noprof mm/mempolicy.c:2345 [inline] folio_alloc_noprof+0x128/0x180 mm/mempolicy.c:2352 filemap_alloc_folio_noprof+0xdf/0x500 mm/filemap.c:1010 do_read_cache_folio+0x2eb/0x850 mm/filemap.c:3787 read_mapping_folio include/linux/pagemap.h:1011 [inline] f2fs_commit_super+0x3c0/0x7d0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4032 f2fs_record_stop_reason+0x13b/0x1d0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4079 f2fs_handle_critical_error+0x2ac/0x5c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4174 f2fs_write_inode+0x35f/0x4d0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:785 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1503 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x711/0x10d0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1723 writeback_single_inode+0x1f3/0x660 fs/fs-writeback.c:1779 sync_inode_metadata+0xc4/0x120 fs/fs-writeback.c:2849 f2fs_release_file+0xa8/0x100 fs/f2fs/file.c:1941 __fput+0x23f/0x880 fs/file_table.c:431 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x168/0x370 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x100/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&sbi->sb_lock){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 down_write+0x99/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1577 f2fs_down_write fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2199 [inline] f2fs_record_stop_reason+0x52/0x1d0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4068 f2fs_handle_critical_error+0x2ac/0x5c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4174 f2fs_evict_inode+0xa61/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:883 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 f2fs_evict_inode+0x1a4/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:807 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 dispose_list fs/inode.c:774 [inline] prune_icache_sb+0x239/0x2f0 fs/inode.c:963 super_cache_scan+0x38c/0x4b0 fs/super.c:223 do_shrink_slab+0x701/0x1160 mm/shrinker.c:435 shrink_slab+0x1093/0x14d0 mm/shrinker.c:662 shrink_one+0x43b/0x850 mm/vmscan.c:4818 shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4879 [inline] lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:4957 [inline] shrink_node+0x3799/0x3de0 mm/vmscan.c:5937 kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6765 [inline] balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6957 [inline] kswapd+0x1ca3/0x3700 mm/vmscan.c:7226 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &sbi->sb_lock --> fs_reclaim --> sb_internal#2 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(sb_internal#2); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(&sbi->sb_lock); Root cause is there will be potential deadlock in between below tasks: Thread A Kswapd - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write - mnt_want_write_file -- down_read lock A - balance_pgdat - __fs_reclaim_acquire -- lock B - shrink_node - prune_icache_sb - dispose_list - f2fs_evict_inode - sb_start_intwrite -- down_read lock A - f2fs_do_sync_file - f2fs_write_inode - f2fs_handle_critical_error - f2fs_record_stop_reason - f2fs_commit_super - read_mapping_folio - filemap_alloc_folio_noprof - fs_reclaim_acquire -- lock B Both threads try to acquire read lock of lock A, then its upcoming write lock grabber will trigger deadlock. Let's always create an asynchronous task in f2fs_handle_critical_error() rather than calling f2fs_record_stop_reason() synchronously to avoid this potential deadlock issue. Fixes: b62e71b ("f2fs: support errors=remount-ro|continue|panic mountoption") Reported-by: syzbot+be4a9983e95a5e25c8d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6704d667.050a0220.1e4d62.0081.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Daejun Park <daejun7.park@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following stack trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty torvalds#85 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from different f2fs shutdown paths: [CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi->gc_thread = NULL < gc_th != NULL > kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF The commit c7f114d ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but it fails to prevent all race conditions. Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown(). Fixes: 7950e9a ("f2fs: stop gc/discard thread after fs shutdown") Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Boot with slub_debug=UFPZ. If allocated object failed in alloc_consistency_checks, all objects of the slab will be marked as used, and then the slab will be removed from the partial list. When an object belonging to the slab got freed later, the remove_full() function is called. Because the slab is neither on the partial list nor on the full list, it eventually lead to a list corruption (actually a list poison being detected). So we need to mark and isolate the slab page with metadata corruption, do not put it back in circulation. Because the debug caches avoid all the fastpaths, reusing the frozen bit to mark slab page with metadata corruption seems to be fine. [ 4277.385669] list_del corruption, ffffea00044b3e50->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100) [ 4277.387023] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 4277.387880] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:56! [ 4277.388680] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 4277.389562] CPU: 5 PID: 90 Comm: kworker/5:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.6.1-1 #1 [ 4277.392113] Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/vda1 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs] [ 4277.393551] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0 [ 4277.394518] Code: 48 91 82 e8 37 f9 9a ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 28 49 91 82 e8 26 f9 9a ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 58 49 91 [ 4277.397292] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000333b38 EFLAGS: 00010082 [ 4277.398202] RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffffea00044b3e50 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 4277.399340] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff828f8715 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 4277.400545] RBP: ffffea00044b3e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc900003339f0 [ 4277.401710] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff82d44088 R12: ffff888112cf9910 [ 4277.402887] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8881000424c0 [ 4277.404049] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88842fd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4277.405357] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4277.406389] CR2: 00007f2ad0b24000 CR3: 0000000102a3a006 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 4277.407589] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 4277.408780] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 4277.410000] PKRU: 55555554 [ 4277.410645] Call Trace: [ 4277.411234] <TASK> [ 4277.411777] ? die+0x32/0x80 [ 4277.412439] ? do_trap+0xd6/0x100 [ 4277.413150] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0 [ 4277.414158] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 [ 4277.414948] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0 [ 4277.415915] ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60 [ 4277.416710] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0 [ 4277.417675] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ 4277.418482] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0 [ 4277.419466] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x7b/0xc0 [ 4277.420410] free_to_partial_list+0x515/0x5e0 [ 4277.421242] ? xfs_iext_remove+0x41a/0xa10 [xfs] [ 4277.422298] xfs_iext_remove+0x41a/0xa10 [xfs] [ 4277.423316] ? xfs_inodegc_worker+0xb4/0x1a0 [xfs] [ 4277.424383] xfs_bmap_del_extent_delay+0x4fe/0x7d0 [xfs] [ 4277.425490] __xfs_bunmapi+0x50d/0x840 [xfs] [ 4277.426445] xfs_itruncate_extents_flags+0x13a/0x490 [xfs] [ 4277.427553] xfs_inactive_truncate+0xa3/0x120 [xfs] [ 4277.428567] xfs_inactive+0x22d/0x290 [xfs] [ 4277.429500] xfs_inodegc_worker+0xb4/0x1a0 [xfs] [ 4277.430479] process_one_work+0x171/0x340 [ 4277.431227] worker_thread+0x277/0x390 [ 4277.431962] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 4277.432752] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ 4277.433382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 4277.434134] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ 4277.434837] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 4277.435566] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 4277.436280] </TASK> Fixes: 643b113 ("slub: enable tracking of full slabs") Suggested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: yuan.gao <yuan.gao@ucloud.cn> Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>

…to avoid deadlock A deadlock may happen since the i3c_master_register() acquires &i3cbus->lock twice. See the log below. Use i3cdev->desc->info instead of calling i3c_device_info() to avoid acquiring the lock twice. v2: - Modified the title and commit message ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.11.0-mainline -------------------------------------------- init/1 is trying to acquire lock: f1ffff80a6a40dc0 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: i3c_bus_normaluse_lock but task is already holding lock: f1ffff80a6a40dc0 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: i3c_master_register other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&i3cbus->lock); lock(&i3cbus->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by init/1: #0: fcffff809b6798f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach #1: f1ffff80a6a40dc0 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: i3c_master_register stack backtrace: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xc0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_deadlock_bug+0x388/0x390 __lock_acquire+0x18bc/0x32ec lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b0 down_read+0x50/0x19c i3c_bus_normaluse_lock+0x14/0x24 i3c_device_get_info+0x24/0x58 i3c_device_uevent+0x34/0xa4 dev_uevent+0x310/0x384 kobject_uevent_env+0x244/0x414 kobject_uevent+0x14/0x20 device_add+0x278/0x460 device_register+0x20/0x34 i3c_master_register_new_i3c_devs+0x78/0x154 i3c_master_register+0x6a0/0x6d4 mtk_i3c_master_probe+0x3b8/0x4d8 platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 really_probe+0x114/0x454 __driver_probe_device+0xa0/0x15c driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x1ac __driver_attach+0xc4/0x1f0 bus_for_each_dev+0x104/0x160 driver_attach+0x24/0x34 bus_add_driver+0x14c/0x294 driver_register+0x68/0x104 __platform_driver_register+0x20/0x30 init_module+0x20/0xfe4 do_one_initcall+0x184/0x464 do_init_module+0x58/0x1ec load_module+0xefc/0x10c8 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x33c invoke_syscall+0x58/0x10c el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x50/0xac el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xbc el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac Signed-off-by: Defa Li <defa.li@mediatek.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241107132549.25439-1-defa.li@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>

The function `e_show` was called with protection from RCU. This only ensures that `exp` will not be freed. Therefore, the reference count for `exp` can drop to zero, which will trigger a refcount use-after-free warning when `exp_get` is called. To resolve this issue, use `cache_get_rcu` to ensure that `exp` remains active. ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 819 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 819 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120 ... Call Trace: <TASK> e_show+0x20b/0x230 [nfsd] seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770 seq_read+0x1e5/0x270 vfs_read+0x125/0x530 ksys_read+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: bf18f16 ("NFSD: Using exp_get for export getting") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20+ Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

The function `c_show` was called with protection from RCU. This only ensures that `cp` will not be freed. Therefore, the reference count for `cp` can drop to zero, which will trigger a refcount use-after-free warning when `cache_get` is called. To resolve this issue, use `cache_get_rcu` to ensure that `cp` remains active. ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 822 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120 CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 822 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120 Call Trace: <TASK> c_show+0x2fc/0x380 [sunrpc] seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770 seq_read+0x1e5/0x270 proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140 vfs_read+0x125/0x530 ksys_read+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

The last reference for `cache_head` can be reduced to zero in `c_show` and `e_show`(using `rcu_read_lock` and `rcu_read_unlock`). Consequently, `svc_export_put` and `expkey_put` will be invoked, leading to two issues: 1. The `svc_export_put` will directly free ex_uuid. However, `e_show`/`c_show` will access `ex_uuid` after `cache_put`, which can trigger a use-after-free issue, shown below. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd] Read of size 1 at addr ff11000010fdc120 by task cat/870 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 870 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3a0 print_report+0xb9/0x280 kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd] c_show+0x161/0x390 [sunrpc] seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770 seq_read+0x1e5/0x270 proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140 vfs_read+0x125/0x530 ksys_read+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Allocated by task 830: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1bc/0x400 kmemdup_noprof+0x22/0x50 svc_export_parse+0x8a9/0xb80 [nfsd] cache_do_downcall+0x71/0xa0 [sunrpc] cache_write_procfs+0x8e/0xd0 [sunrpc] proc_reg_write+0xe1/0x140 vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 868: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50 kfree+0xf3/0x3e0 svc_export_put+0x87/0xb0 [nfsd] cache_purge+0x17f/0x1f0 [sunrpc] nfsd_destroy_serv+0x226/0x2d0 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e 2. We cannot sleep while using `rcu_read_lock`/`rcu_read_unlock`. However, `svc_export_put`/`expkey_put` will call path_put, which subsequently triggers a sleeping operation due to the following `dput`. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.10.0-dirty torvalds#141 Not tainted ----------------------------- ... Call Trace: dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0 ___might_sleep+0x231/0x240 dput+0x39/0x600 path_put+0x1b/0x30 svc_export_put+0x17/0x80 e_show+0x1c9/0x200 seq_read_iter+0x63f/0x7c0 seq_read+0x226/0x2d0 vfs_read+0x113/0x2c0 ksys_read+0xc9/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 Fix these issues by using `rcu_work` to help release `svc_expkey`/`svc_export`. This approach allows for an asynchronous context to invoke `path_put` and also facilitates the freeing of `uuid/exp/key` after an RCU grace period. Fixes: 9ceddd9 ("knfsd: Allow lockless lookups of the exports") Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

There's issue as follows: RPC: Registered rdma transport module. RPC: Registered rdma backchannel transport module. RPC: Unregistered rdma transport module. RPC: Unregistered rdma backchannel transport module. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80c609a PGD 123fee067 P4D 123fee067 PUD 123fea067 PMD 10c624067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:percpu_counter_destroy_many+0xf7/0x2a0 Call Trace: <TASK> __die+0x1f/0x70 page_fault_oops+0x2cd/0x860 spurious_kernel_fault+0x36/0x450 do_kern_addr_fault+0xca/0x100 exc_page_fault+0x128/0x150 asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 percpu_counter_destroy_many+0xf7/0x2a0 mmdrop+0x209/0x350 finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x481/0x840 schedule_tail+0xe/0xd0 ret_from_fork+0x23/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> If register_sysctl() return NULL, then svc_rdma_proc_cleanup() will not destroy the percpu counters which init in svc_rdma_proc_init(). If CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU is enabled, residual nodes may be in the 'percpu_counters' list. The above issue may occur once the module is removed. If the CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU configuration is not enabled, memory leakage occurs. To solve above issue just destroy all percpu counters when register_sysctl() return NULL. Fixes: 1e7e557 ("svcrdma: Restore read and write stats") Fixes: 22df5a2 ("svcrdma: Convert rdma_stat_sq_starve to a per-CPU counter") Fixes: df971cd ("svcrdma: Convert rdma_stat_recv to a per-CPU counter") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

There are cases where a PCIe extended capability should be hidden from the user. For example, an unknown capability (i.e., capability with ID greater than PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX) or a capability that is intentionally chosen to be hidden from the user. Hiding a capability is done by virtualizing and modifying the 'Next Capability Offset' field of the previous capability so it points to the capability after the one that should be hidden. The special case where the first capability in the list should be hidden is handled differently because there is no previous capability that can be modified. In this case, the capability ID and version are zeroed while leaving the next pointer intact. This hides the capability and leaves an anchor for the rest of the capability list. However, today, hiding the first capability in the list is not done properly if the capability is unknown, as struct vfio_pci_core_device->pci_config_map is set to the capability ID during initialization but the capability ID is not properly checked later when used in vfio_config_do_rw(). This leads to the following warning [1] and to an out-of-bounds access to ecap_perms array. Fix it by checking cap_id in vfio_config_do_rw(), and if it is greater than PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX, use an alternative struct perm_bits for direct read only access instead of the ecap_perms array. Note that this is safe since the above is the only case where cap_id can exceed PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX (except for the special capabilities, which are already checked before). [1] WARNING: CPU: 118 PID: 5329 at drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c:1900 vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] CPU: 118 UID: 0 PID: 5329 Comm: simx-qemu-syste Not tainted 6.12.0+ #1 (snip) Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x69/0x80 ? __warn+0x8d/0x140 ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] ? report_bug+0x18f/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x63/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x244/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_pci_rw+0x101/0x1b0 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_pci_core_read+0x1d/0x30 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_device_fops_read+0x27/0x40 [vfio] vfs_read+0xbd/0x340 ? vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0xbb/0x740 [vfio] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xa4/0x4b0 __x64_sys_pread64+0x96/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x1c3d/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 89e1f7d ("vfio: Add PCI device driver") Signed-off-by: Avihai Horon <avihaih@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@intel.com> Tested-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241124142739.21698-1-avihaih@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>

Passing MSG_PEEK flag to skb_recv_datagram() increments skb refcount (skb->users) and iucv_sock_recvmsg() does not decrement skb refcount at exit. This results in skb memory leak in skb_queue_purge() and WARN_ON in iucv_sock_destruct() during socket close. To fix this decrease skb refcount by one if MSG_PEEK is set in order to prevent memory leak and WARN_ON. WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6292 at net/iucv/af_iucv.c:286 iucv_sock_destruct+0x144/0x1a0 [af_iucv] CPU: 2 PID: 6292 Comm: afiucv_test_msg Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc7 #1 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (z/VM 7.3.0) Call Trace: [<001587c682c4aa98>] iucv_sock_destruct+0x148/0x1a0 [af_iucv] [<001587c682c4a9d0>] iucv_sock_destruct+0x80/0x1a0 [af_iucv] [<001587c704117a32>] __sk_destruct+0x52/0x550 [<001587c704104a54>] __sock_release+0xa4/0x230 [<001587c704104c0c>] sock_close+0x2c/0x40 [<001587c702c5f5a8>] __fput+0x2e8/0x970 [<001587c7024148c4>] task_work_run+0x1c4/0x2c0 [<001587c7023b0716>] do_exit+0x996/0x1050 [<001587c7023b13aa>] do_group_exit+0x13a/0x360 [<001587c7023b1626>] __s390x_sys_exit_group+0x56/0x60 [<001587c7022bccca>] do_syscall+0x27a/0x380 [<001587c7049a6a0c>] __do_syscall+0x9c/0x160 [<001587c7049ce8a8>] system_call+0x70/0x98 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<001587c682c4a9d4>] iucv_sock_destruct+0x84/0x1a0 [af_iucv] Fixes: eac3731 ("[S390]: Add AF_IUCV socket support") Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thorsten Winkler <twinkler@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sidraya Jayagond <sidraya@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Wei <dw@davidwei.uk> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241119152219.3712168-1-wintera@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Commit bab1c29 ("LoongArch: Fix sleeping in atomic context in setup_tlb_handler()") changes the gfp flag from GFP_KERNEL to GFP_ATOMIC for alloc_pages_node(). However, for PREEMPT_RT kernels we can still get a "sleeping in atomic context" error: [ 0.372259] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 [ 0.372266] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 [ 0.372268] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 [ 0.372270] RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1 [ 0.372272] 3 locks held by swapper/1/0: [ 0.372274] #0: 900000000c9f5e60 (&pcp->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: get_page_from_freelist+0x524/0x1c60 [ 0.372294] #1: 90000000087013b8 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rt_spin_trylock+0x50/0x140 [ 0.372305] #2: 900000047fffd388 (&zone->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __rmqueue_pcplist+0x30c/0xea0 [ 0.372314] irq event stamp: 0 [ 0.372316] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [ 0.372322] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<9000000005947320>] copy_process+0x9c0/0x26e0 [ 0.372329] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<9000000005947320>] copy_process+0x9c0/0x26e0 [ 0.372335] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [ 0.372341] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7+ #1891 [ 0.372346] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB/Loongson-LS3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB, BIOS vUDK2018-LoongArch-V2.0.0-prebeta9 10/21/2022 [ 0.372349] Stack : 0000000000000089 9000000005a0db9c 90000000071519c8 9000000100388000 [ 0.372486] 900000010038b890 0000000000000000 900000010038b898 9000000007e53788 [ 0.372492] 900000000815bcc8 900000000815bcc0 900000010038b700 0000000000000001 [ 0.372498] 0000000000000001 4b031894b9d6b725 00000000055ec000 9000000100338fc0 [ 0.372503] 00000000000000c4 0000000000000001 000000000000002d 0000000000000003 [ 0.372509] 0000000000000030 0000000000000003 00000000055ec000 0000000000000003 [ 0.372515] 900000000806d000 9000000007e53788 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 [ 0.372521] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 900000000c9f5f10 0000000000000000 [ 0.372526] 90000000076f12d8 9000000007e53788 9000000005924778 0000000000000000 [ 0.372532] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000070000 [ 0.372537] ... [ 0.372540] Call Trace: [ 0.372542] [<9000000005924778>] show_stack+0x38/0x180 [ 0.372548] [<90000000071519c4>] dump_stack_lvl+0x94/0xe4 [ 0.372555] [<900000000599b880>] __might_resched+0x1a0/0x260 [ 0.372561] [<90000000071675cc>] rt_spin_lock+0x4c/0x140 [ 0.372565] [<9000000005cbb768>] __rmqueue_pcplist+0x308/0xea0 [ 0.372570] [<9000000005cbed84>] get_page_from_freelist+0x564/0x1c60 [ 0.372575] [<9000000005cc0d98>] __alloc_pages_noprof+0x218/0x1820 [ 0.372580] [<900000000593b36c>] tlb_init+0x1ac/0x298 [ 0.372585] [<9000000005924b74>] per_cpu_trap_init+0x114/0x140 [ 0.372589] [<9000000005921964>] cpu_probe+0x4e4/0xa60 [ 0.372592] [<9000000005934874>] start_secondary+0x34/0xc0 [ 0.372599] [<900000000715615c>] smpboot_entry+0x64/0x6c This is because in PREEMPT_RT kernels normal spinlocks are replaced by rt spinlocks and rt_spin_lock() will cause sleeping. Fix it by disabling NUMA optimization completely for PREEMPT_RT kernels. Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

The MTU setting at the time an XDP multi-buffer is attached determines whether the aggregation ring will be used and the rx_skb_func handler. This is done in bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(). If the MTU is later changed, the aggregation ring setting may need to be changed and it may become out-of-sync with the settings initially done in bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(). This may result in random memory corruption and crashes as the HW may DMA data larger than the allocated buffer size, such as: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 6.1.0-226bf9805506 #1 Hardware name: Wiwynn Delta Lake PVT BZA.02601.0150/Delta Lake-Class1, BIOS F0E_3A12 08/26/2021 RIP: 0010:bnxt_rx_pkt+0xe97/0x1ae0 [bnxt_en] Code: 8b 95 70 ff ff ff 4c 8b 9d 48 ff ff ff 66 41 89 87 b4 00 00 00 e9 0b f7 ff ff 0f b7 43 0a 49 8b 95 a8 04 00 00 25 ff 0f 00 00 <0f> b7 14 42 48 c1 e2 06 49 03 95 a0 04 00 00 0f b6 42 33f RSP: 0018:ffffa19f40cc0d18 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000001e0 RBX: ffff8e2c805c6100 RCX: 00000000000007ff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8e2c271ab990 RDI: ffff8e2c84f12380 RBP: ffffa19f40cc0e48 R08: 000000000001000d R09: 974ea2fcddfa4cbf R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffa19f40cc0ff8 R12: ffff8e2c94b58980 R13: ffff8e2c952d6600 R14: 0000000000000016 R15: ffff8e2c271ab990 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e3b3f840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000003c0 CR3: 0000000e8580a004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> __bnxt_poll_work+0x1c2/0x3e0 [bnxt_en] To address the issue, we now call bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode() within bnxt_change_mtu() to properly set the AGG rings configuration and update rx_skb_func based on the new MTU value. Additionally, BNXT_FLAG_NO_AGG_RINGS is cleared at the beginning of bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode() to make sure it gets set or cleared based on the current MTU. Fixes: 08450ea ("bnxt_en: Fix max_mtu setting for multi-buf XDP") Co-developed-by: Somnath Kotur <somnath.kotur@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Somnath Kotur <somnath.kotur@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Shravya KN <shravya.k-n@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

This fixes possible deadlocks like the following caused by hci_cmd_sync_dequeue causing the destroy function to run: INFO: task kworker/u19:0:143 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-2024-03-19-intel-next-iLS-24ww14 #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u19:0 state:D stack:0 pid:143 tgid:143 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth] Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x374/0xaf0 schedule+0x3c/0xf0 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x1c/0x30 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x3ef/0x7a0 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20 mutex_lock+0x3c/0x50 mgmt_set_connectable_complete+0xa4/0x150 [bluetooth] ? kfree+0x211/0x2a0 hci_cmd_sync_dequeue+0xae/0x130 [bluetooth] ? __pfx_cmd_complete_rsp+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] cmd_complete_rsp+0x26/0x80 [bluetooth] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x4d/0x70 [bluetooth] __mgmt_power_off+0x8d/0x180 [bluetooth] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x23/0x40 hci_dev_close_sync+0x445/0x5b0 [bluetooth] hci_set_powered_sync+0x149/0x250 [bluetooth] set_powered_sync+0x24/0x60 [bluetooth] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x90/0x150 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x13e/0x300 worker_thread+0x2f7/0x420 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x107/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Tested-by: Kiran K <kiran.k@intel.com> Fixes: f53e1c9 ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible crash on mgmt_index_removed") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

Jiayuan Chen says: ==================== bpf: Fix array bounds error with may_goto and add selftest Syzbot caught an array out-of-bounds bug [1]. It turns out that when the BPF program runs through do_misc_fixups(), it allocates an extra 8 bytes on the call stack, which eventually causes stack_depth to exceed 512. I was able to reproduce this issue probabilistically by enabling CONFIG_UBSAN=y and disabling CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON with the selfttest I provide in second patch(although it doesn't happen every time - I didn't dig deeper into why UBSAN behaves this way). Furthermore, if I set /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable to 0 to disable the jit, a panic occurs, and the reason is the same, that bpf_func is assigned an incorrect address. [---[ end trace ]--- [Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x100f0e0e0d090808: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE [RIP: 0010:bpf_test_run+0x1d2/0x360 [RSP: 0018:ffffafc7955178a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [RAX: 100f0e0e0d090808 RBX: ffff8e9fdb2c4100 RCX: 0000000000000018 [RDX: 00000000002b5b18 RSI: ffffafc780497048 RDI: ffff8ea04d601700 [RBP: ffffafc780497000 R08: ffffafc795517a0c R09: 0000000000000000 [R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8ea04d601700 [R13: ffffafc795517928 R14: ffffafc795517928 R15: 0000000000000000 [CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [CR2: 00007f181c064648 CR3: 00000001aa2be003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [PKRU: 55555554 [Call Trace: [ <TASK> [ ? die_addr+0x36/0x90 [ ? exc_general_protection+0x237/0x430 [ ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [ ? bpf_test_run+0x1d2/0x360 [ ? bpf_test_run+0x10d/0x360 [ ? __link_object+0x12a/0x1e0 [ ? slab_build_skb+0x23/0x130 [ ? kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2ea/0x3f0 [ ? sk_prot_alloc+0xc2/0x120 [ bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x21b/0x590 [ __sys_bpf+0x340/0xa80 [ __x64_sys_bpf+0x1e/0x30 --- v2 -> v3: Optimized some code naming and conditional judgment logic. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250213131214.164982-1-mrpre@163.com/T/ v1 -> v2: Directly reject loading programs with a stack size greater than 512 when jit disabled.(Suggested by Alexei Starovoitov) https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250212135251.85487-1-mrpre@163.com/T/ ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250214091823.46042-1-mrpre@163.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Eduard Zingerman says: ==================== This patch set fixes a bug in copy_verifier_state() where the loop_entry field was not copied. This omission led to incorrect loop_entry fields remaining in env->cur_state, causing incorrect decisions about loop entry assignments in update_loop_entry(). An example of an unsafe program accepted by the verifier due to this bug can be found in patch #2. This bug can also cause an infinite loop in the verifier, see patch #5. Structure of the patch set: - Patch #1 fixes the bug but has a significant negative impact on verification performance for sched_ext programs. - Patch #3 mitigates the verification performance impact of patch #1 by avoiding clean_live_states() for states whose loop_entry is still being verified. This reduces the number of processed instructions for sched_ext programs by 28–92% in some cases. - Patches #5-6 simplify {get,update}_loop_entry() logic (and are not strictly necessary). - Patches torvalds#7–10 mitigate the memory overhead introduced by patch #1 when a program with iterator-based loop hits the 1M instruction limit. This is achieved by freeing states in env->free_list when their branches and used_as_loop_entry counts reach zero. Patches #1-4 were previously sent as a part of [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250122120442.3536298-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/ ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250215110411.3236773-1-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

…uctions Add several ./test_progs tests: - arena_atomics/load_acquire - arena_atomics/store_release - verifier_load_acquire/* - verifier_store_release/* - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the new instructions correctly. Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier "remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack slot. For example, if we take a look at the test program: #0: r1 = 8; /* store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1); */ #1: .8byte %[store_release]; #2: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); #3: r2 = r10; #4: r2 += r1; #5: r0 = 0; torvalds#6: exit; At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack, then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected: VERIFIER LOG: ============= ... math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed For easier CI integration, instead of using built-ins like __atomic_{load,store}_n() which depend on the new __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL pre-defined macro, manually craft load-acquire/store-release instructions using __imm_insn(), as suggested by Eduard. All new tests depend on: (1) Clang major version >= 18, and (2) ENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS is defined (currently implies -mcpu=v3 or v4), and (3) JIT supports load-acquire/store-release (currently arm64 and x86-64) In .../progs/arena_atomics.c: /* 8-byte-aligned */ __u8 __arena_global load_acquire8_value = 0x12; /* 1-byte hole */ __u16 __arena_global load_acquire16_value = 0x1234; That 1-byte hole in the .addr_space.1 ELF section caused clang-17 to crash: fatal error: error in backend: unable to write nop sequence of 1 bytes To work around such llvm-17 CI job failures, conditionally define __arena_global variables as 64-bit if __clang_major__ < 18, to make sure .addr_space.1 has no holes. Ideally we should avoid compiling this file using clang-17 at all (arena tests depend on __BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST, and are skipped for llvm-17 anyway), but that is a separate topic. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b46c6feaf0f1b6984d9ec80e500cc7383e9da1a.1741049567.git.yepeilin@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Since commit 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API") there is the following ABBA deadlock (simplified) between the LED trigger code and the power-supply code: 1) When registering a power-supply class device, power_supply_register() calls led_trigger_register() from power_supply_create_triggers() in a scoped_guard(rwsem_read, &psy->extensions_sem) context. led_trigger_register() then in turn takes a LED subsystem lock. So here we have the following locking order: * Read-lock extensions_sem * Lock LED subsystem lock(s) 2) When registering a LED class device, with its default trigger set to a power-supply LED trigger (which has already been registered) The LED class code calls power_supply_led_trigger_activate() when setting up the default trigger. power_supply_led_trigger_activate() calls power_supply_get_property() to determine the initial value of to assign to the LED and that read-locks extensions_sem. So now we have the following locking order: * Lock LED subsystem lock(s) * Read-lock extensions_sem Fixing this is easy, there is no need to hold the extensions_sem when calling power_supply_create_triggers() since all triggers are always created rather then checking for the presence of certain attributes as power_supply_add_hwmon_sysfs() does. Move power_supply_create_triggers() out of the guard block to fix this. Here is the lockdep report fixed by this change: [ 31.249343] ====================================================== [ 31.249378] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 31.249413] 6.13.0-rc6+ torvalds#251 Tainted: G C E [ 31.249440] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 31.249471] (udev-worker)/553 is trying to acquire lock: [ 31.249501] ffff892adbcaf660 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150 [ 31.249574] but task is already holding lock: [ 31.249603] ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0 [ 31.249657] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 31.249696] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 31.249735] -> #2 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 31.249778] down_write+0x3b/0xd0 [ 31.249803] led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0 [ 31.249833] led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0 [ 31.249863] input_leds_connect+0x1dc/0x2a0 [ 31.249889] input_attach_handler.isra.0+0x75/0x90 [ 31.249921] input_register_device.cold+0xa1/0x150 [ 31.249955] hidinput_connect+0x8a2/0xb80 [ 31.249982] hid_connect+0x582/0x5c0 [ 31.250007] hid_hw_start+0x3f/0x60 [ 31.250030] hid_device_probe+0x122/0x1f0 [ 31.250053] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.250080] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.250105] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.250132] __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 [ 31.250160] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0 [ 31.250184] __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0 [ 31.250207] bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0 [ 31.250230] device_add+0x64a/0x860 [ 31.250252] hid_add_device+0xe5/0x240 [ 31.250279] usbhid_probe+0x4dc/0x620 [ 31.250303] usb_probe_interface+0xe4/0x2a0 [ 31.250329] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.250353] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.250377] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.250404] __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 [ 31.250431] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0 [ 31.250455] __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0 [ 31.250478] bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0 [ 31.250501] device_add+0x64a/0x860 [ 31.250523] usb_set_configuration+0x606/0x8a0 [ 31.250552] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x3e/0x60 [ 31.250579] usb_probe_device+0x3d/0x120 [ 31.250605] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.250629] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.250653] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.250680] __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 [ 31.250707] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0 [ 31.250731] __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0 [ 31.250753] bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0 [ 31.250776] device_add+0x64a/0x860 [ 31.250798] usb_new_device.cold+0x141/0x38f [ 31.250828] hub_event+0x1166/0x1980 [ 31.250854] process_one_work+0x20f/0x580 [ 31.250879] worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0 [ 31.250904] kthread+0xee/0x120 [ 31.250926] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 [ 31.250954] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 31.250982] -> #1 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 31.251022] down_write+0x3b/0xd0 [ 31.251045] led_trigger_register+0x40/0x1b0 [ 31.251074] power_supply_register_led_trigger+0x88/0x150 [ 31.251107] power_supply_create_triggers+0x55/0xe0 [ 31.251135] __power_supply_register.part.0+0x34e/0x4a0 [ 31.251164] devm_power_supply_register+0x70/0xc0 [ 31.251190] bq27xxx_battery_setup+0x1a1/0x6d0 [bq27xxx_battery] [ 31.251235] bq27xxx_battery_i2c_probe+0xe5/0x17f [bq27xxx_battery_i2c] [ 31.251272] i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0 [ 31.251299] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.251324] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.251348] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.251375] __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 [ 31.251398] bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0 [ 31.251421] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0 [ 31.251445] driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 [ 31.251470] i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0 [ 31.251498] do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0 [ 31.251522] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [ 31.251550] __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190 [ 31.251575] do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 [ 31.251598] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 31.251629] -> #0 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}: [ 31.251668] __lock_acquire+0x13ce/0x21c0 [ 31.251694] lock_acquire+0xcf/0x2e0 [ 31.251719] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 31.251741] power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150 [ 31.251774] power_supply_update_leds+0x8d/0x230 [ 31.251804] power_supply_led_trigger_activate+0x18/0x20 [ 31.251837] led_trigger_set+0x1fc/0x300 [ 31.251863] led_trigger_set_default+0x90/0xe0 [ 31.251892] led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0 [ 31.251921] devm_led_classdev_multicolor_register_ext+0x6e/0xb80 [led_class_multicolor] [ 31.251969] ktd202x_probe+0x464/0x5c0 [leds_ktd202x] [ 31.252002] i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0 [ 31.252027] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.252052] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.252076] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.252103] __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 [ 31.252125] bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0 [ 31.252148] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0 [ 31.252172] driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 [ 31.252197] i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0 [ 31.252225] do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0 [ 31.252248] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [ 31.252274] __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190 [ 31.253986] do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 [ 31.255826] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 31.257614] other info that might help us debug this: [ 31.257619] Chain exists of: &psy->extensions_sem --> triggers_list_lock --> &led_cdev->trigger_lock [ 31.257630] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 31.257632] CPU0 CPU1 [ 31.257633] ---- ---- [ 31.257634] lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock); [ 31.257637] lock(triggers_list_lock); [ 31.257640] lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock); [ 31.257643] rlock(&psy->extensions_sem); [ 31.257646] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 31.289433] 4 locks held by (udev-worker)/553: [ 31.289443] #0: ffff892ad9658108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0xaf/0x1c0 [ 31.289463] #1: ffff892adbc0bbc8 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_classdev_register_ext+0x1c7/0x3a0 [ 31.289476] #2: ffffffffad0e30b0 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x2c/0xe0 [ 31.289487] #3: ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0 Fixes: 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API") Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Cc: Armin Wolf <W_Armin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130140035.20636-1-hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>

In Inline mode, the journal is unused, and journal_sectors is zero. Calculating the journal watermark requires dividing by journal_sectors, which should be done only if the journal is configured. Otherwise, a simple table query (dmsetup table) can cause OOPS. This bug did not show on some systems, perhaps only due to compiler optimization. On my 32-bit testing machine, this reliably crashes with the following: : Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP : CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2450 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ torvalds#959 : EIP: dm_integrity_status+0x2f8/0xab0 [dm_integrity] ... Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Fixes: fb09876 ("dm-integrity: introduce the Inline mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11+

The namespace percpu counter protects pending I/O, and we can only safely diable the namespace once the counter drop to zero. Otherwise we end up with a crash when running blktests/nvme/058 (eg for loop transport): [ 2352.930426] [ T53909] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI [ 2352.930431] [ T53909] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] [ 2352.930434] [ T53909] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 53909 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6 torvalds#232 [ 2352.930438] [ T53909] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 2352.930440] [ T53909] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [ 2352.930443] [ T53909] Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvme_loop_execute_work [nvme_loop] [ 2352.930449] [ T53909] RIP: 0010:blkcg_set_ioprio+0x44/0x180 as the queue is already torn down when calling submit_bio(); So we need to init the percpu counter in nvmet_ns_enable(), and wait for it to drop to zero in nvmet_ns_disable() to avoid having I/O pending after the namespace has been disabled. Fixes: 74d1696 ("nvmet-loop: avoid using mutex in IO hotpath") Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>

The delayed work item function nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work() polls all submission queues and keeps running in a loop as long as commands are being submitted by the host. Depending on the preemption configuration of the kernel, under heavy command workload, this function can thus run for more than RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT seconds, leading to a RCU stall: rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 5-....: (20998 ticks this GP) idle=4244/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=301/301 fqs=5132 rcu: (t=21000 jiffies g=-443 q=12 ncpus=8) CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2 #1 Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT) Workqueue: events nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work [nvmet_pci_epf] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : dw_edma_device_tx_status+0xb8/0x130 lr : dw_edma_device_tx_status+0x9c/0x130 sp : ffff800080b5bbb0 x29: ffff800080b5bbb0 x28: ffff0331c5c78400 x27: ffff0331c1cd1960 x26: ffff0331c0e39010 x25: ffff0331c20e4000 x24: ffff0331c20e4a90 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 00000000005aca33 x20: ffff800080b5bc30 x19: ffff0331c123e370 x18: 000000000ab29e62 x17: ffffb2a878c9c118 x16: ffff0335bde82040 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 000000000000017b x13: 00000000ee601780 x12: 0000000000000018 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000040 x8 : 00000000ee601780 x7 : 0000000105c785c0 x6 : ffff0331c1027d80 x5 : 0000000001ee7ad6 x4 : ffff0335bdea16c0 x3 : ffff0331c123e438 x2 : 00000000005aca33 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0331c123e410 Call trace: dw_edma_device_tx_status+0xb8/0x130 (P) dma_sync_wait+0x60/0xbc nvmet_pci_epf_dma_transfer+0x128/0x264 [nvmet_pci_epf] nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work+0x2a0/0x2e0 [nvmet_pci_epf] process_one_work+0x144/0x390 worker_thread+0x27c/0x458 kthread+0xe8/0x19c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The solution for this is simply to explicitly allow rescheduling using cond_resched(). However, since doing so for every loop of nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work() significantly degrades performance (for 4K random reads using 4 I/O queues, the maximum IOPS goes down from 137 KIOPS to 110 KIOPS), call cond_resched() every second to avoid the RCU stalls. Fixes: 0faa0fe ("nvmet: New NVMe PCI endpoint function target driver") Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>

…umers While using nvme target with use_srq on, below kernel panic is noticed. [ 549.698111] bnxt_en 0000:41:00.0 enp65s0np0: FEC autoneg off encoding: Clause 91 RS(544,514) [ 566.393619] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI .. [ 566.393799] <TASK> [ 566.393807] ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60 [ 566.393823] ? die+0x38/0x60 [ 566.393835] ? do_trap+0xe4/0x110 [ 566.393847] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re] [ 566.393867] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re] [ 566.393881] ? do_error_trap+0x7c/0x120 [ 566.393890] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re] [ 566.393911] ? exc_divide_error+0x34/0x50 [ 566.393923] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re] [ 566.393939] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x16/0x20 [ 566.393966] ? bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0x1d4/0x580 [bnxt_re] [ 566.393997] bnxt_qplib_create_srq+0xc9/0x340 [bnxt_re] [ 566.394040] bnxt_re_create_srq+0x335/0x3b0 [bnxt_re] [ 566.394057] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 566.394068] ? __init_swait_queue_head+0x4a/0x60 [ 566.394090] ib_create_srq_user+0xa7/0x150 [ib_core] [ 566.394147] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect+0x7d0/0xbe0 [nvmet_rdma] [ 566.394174] ? lock_release+0x22c/0x3f0 [ 566.394187] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f Page size and shift info is set only for the user space SRQs. Set page size and page shift for kernel space SRQs also. Fixes: 0c4dcd6 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Refactor hardware queue memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1740237621-29291-1-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.14, take #1 - Fix hart status check in SBI HSM extension - Fix hart suspend_type usage in SBI HSM extension - Fix error returned by SBI IPI and TIME extensions for unsupported function IDs - Fix suspend_type usage in SBI SUSP extension - Remove unnecessary vcpu kick after injecting interrupt via IMSIC guest file

We have recently seen reports of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings when loading the iAVF driver: [ 1504.790308] ====================================================== [ 1504.790309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 1504.790310] 6.13.0 #net_next_rt.c2933b2befe2.el9 Not tainted [ 1504.790311] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 1504.790312] kworker/u128:0/13566 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1504.790313] ffff97d0e4738f18 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: register_netdevice+0x52c/0x710 [ 1504.790320] [ 1504.790320] but task is already holding lock: [ 1504.790321] ffff97d0e47392e8 (&adapter->crit_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: iavf_finish_config+0x37/0x240 [iavf] [ 1504.790330] [ 1504.790330] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 1504.790330] [ 1504.790330] [ 1504.790330] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 1504.790331] [ 1504.790331] -> #1 (&adapter->crit_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 1504.790333] __lock_acquire+0x52d/0xbb0 [ 1504.790337] lock_acquire+0xd9/0x330 [ 1504.790338] mutex_lock_nested+0x4b/0xb0 [ 1504.790341] iavf_finish_config+0x37/0x240 [iavf] [ 1504.790347] process_one_work+0x248/0x6d0 [ 1504.790350] worker_thread+0x18d/0x330 [ 1504.790352] kthread+0x10e/0x250 [ 1504.790354] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 [ 1504.790357] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 1504.790361] [ 1504.790361] -> #0 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 1504.790364] check_prev_add+0xf1/0xce0 [ 1504.790366] validate_chain+0x46a/0x570 [ 1504.790368] __lock_acquire+0x52d/0xbb0 [ 1504.790370] lock_acquire+0xd9/0x330 [ 1504.790371] mutex_lock_nested+0x4b/0xb0 [ 1504.790372] register_netdevice+0x52c/0x710 [ 1504.790374] iavf_finish_config+0xfa/0x240 [iavf] [ 1504.790379] process_one_work+0x248/0x6d0 [ 1504.790381] worker_thread+0x18d/0x330 [ 1504.790383] kthread+0x10e/0x250 [ 1504.790385] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 [ 1504.790387] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 1504.790389] [ 1504.790389] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1504.790389] [ 1504.790389] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1504.790389] [ 1504.790390] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1504.790391] ---- ---- [ 1504.790391] lock(&adapter->crit_lock); [ 1504.790393] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1504.790394] lock(&adapter->crit_lock); [ 1504.790395] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1504.790397] [ 1504.790397] *** DEADLOCK *** This appears to be caused by the change in commit 5fda3f3 ("net: make netdev_lock() protect netdev->reg_state"), which added a netdev_lock() in register_netdevice. The iAVF driver calls register_netdevice() from iavf_finish_config(), as a final stage of its state machine post-probe. It currently takes the RTNL lock, then the netdev lock, and then the device critical lock. This pattern is used throughout the driver. Thus there is a strong dependency that the crit_lock should not be acquired before the net device lock. The change to register_netdevice creates an ABBA lock order violation because the iAVF driver is holding the crit_lock while calling register_netdevice, which then takes the netdev_lock. It seems likely that future refactors could result in netdev APIs which hold the netdev_lock while calling into the driver. This means that we should not re-order the locks so that netdev_lock is acquired after the device private crit_lock. Instead, notice that we already release the netdev_lock prior to calling the register_netdevice. This flow only happens during the early driver initialization as we transition through the __IAVF_STARTUP, __IAVF_INIT_VERSION_CHECK, __IAVF_INIT_GET_RESOURCES, etc. Analyzing the places where we take crit_lock in the driver there are two sources: a) several of the work queue tasks including adminq_task, watchdog_task, reset_task, and the finish_config task. b) various callbacks which ultimately stem back to .ndo operations or ethtool operations. The latter cannot be triggered until after the netdevice registration is completed successfully. The iAVF driver uses alloc_ordered_workqueue, which is an unbound workqueue that has a max limit of 1, and thus guarantees that only a single work item on the queue is executing at any given time, so none of the other work threads could be executing due to the ordered workqueue guarantees. The iavf_finish_config() function also does not do anything else after register_netdevice, unless it fails. It seems unlikely that the driver private crit_lock is protecting anything that register_netdevice() itself touches. Thus, to fix this ABBA lock violation, lets simply release the adapter->crit_lock as well as netdev_lock prior to calling register_netdevice(). We do still keep holding the RTNL lock as required by the function. If we do fail to register the netdevice, then we re-acquire the adapter critical lock to finish the transition back to __IAVF_INIT_CONFIG_ADAPTER. This ensures every call where both netdev_lock and the adapter->crit_lock are acquired under the same ordering. Fixes: afc6649 ("eth: iavf: extend the netdev_lock usage") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250224190647.3601930-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

The customer reports that there is a soft lockup issue related to the i2c driver. After checking, the i2c module was doing a tx transfer and the bmc machine reboots in the middle of the i2c transaction, the i2c module keeps the status without being reset. Due to such an i2c module status, the i2c irq handler keeps getting triggered since the i2c irq handler is registered in the kernel booting process after the bmc machine is doing a warm rebooting. The continuous triggering is stopped by the soft lockup watchdog timer. Disable the interrupt enable bit in the i2c module before calling devm_request_irq to fix this issue since the i2c relative status bit is read-only. Here is the soft lockup log. [ 28.176395] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [swapper/0:1] [ 28.183351] Modules linked in: [ 28.186407] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.120-yocto-s-dirty-bbebc78 #1 [ 28.201174] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 28.208128] pc : __do_softirq+0xb0/0x368 [ 28.212055] lr : __do_softirq+0x70/0x368 [ 28.215972] sp : ffffff8035ebca00 [ 28.219278] x29: ffffff8035ebca00 x28: 0000000000000002 x27: ffffff80071a3780 [ 28.226412] x26: ffffffc008bdc000 x25: ffffffc008bcc640 x24: ffffffc008be50c0 [ 28.233546] x23: ffffffc00800200c x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 000000000000001b [ 28.240679] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff80001c3200 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 28.247812] x17: ffffffc02d2e0000 x16: ffffff8035eb8b40 x15: 00001e8480000000 [ 28.254945] x14: 02c3647e37dbfcb6 x13: 02c364f2ab14200c x12: 0000000002c364f2 [ 28.262078] x11: 00000000fa83b2da x10: 000000000000b67e x9 : ffffffc008010250 [ 28.269211] x8 : 000000009d983d00 x7 : 7fffffffffffffff x6 : 0000036d74732434 [ 28.276344] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 0000000000000015 x3 : 0000000000000198 [ 28.283476] x2 : ffffffc02d2e0000 x1 : 00000000000000e0 x0 : ffffffc008bdcb40 [ 28.290611] Call trace: [ 28.293052] __do_softirq+0xb0/0x368 [ 28.296625] __irq_exit_rcu+0xe0/0x100 [ 28.300374] irq_exit+0x14/0x20 [ 28.303513] handle_domain_irq+0x68/0x90 [ 28.307440] gic_handle_irq+0x78/0xb0 [ 28.311098] call_on_irq_stack+0x20/0x38 [ 28.315019] do_interrupt_handler+0x54/0x5c [ 28.319199] el1_interrupt+0x2c/0x4c [ 28.322777] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x20 [ 28.326872] el1h_64_irq+0x74/0x78 [ 28.330269] __setup_irq+0x454/0x780 [ 28.333841] request_threaded_irq+0xd0/0x1b4 [ 28.338107] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x84/0x100 [ 28.342809] npcm_i2c_probe_bus+0x188/0x3d0 [ 28.346990] platform_probe+0x6c/0xc4 [ 28.350653] really_probe+0xcc/0x45c [ 28.354227] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x160 [ 28.358578] driver_probe_device+0x44/0xe0 [ 28.362670] __driver_attach+0x124/0x1d0 [ 28.366589] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0 [ 28.370426] driver_attach+0x28/0x30 [ 28.373997] bus_add_driver+0x124/0x240 [ 28.377830] driver_register+0x7c/0x124 [ 28.381662] __platform_driver_register+0x2c/0x34 [ 28.386362] npcm_i2c_init+0x3c/0x5c [ 28.389937] do_one_initcall+0x74/0x230 [ 28.393768] kernel_init_freeable+0x24c/0x2b4 [ 28.398126] kernel_init+0x28/0x130 [ 28.401614] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 28.405189] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks [ 28.411011] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 28.414933] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 28.418412] CPU features: 0x00000000,00000802 [ 28.427644] Rebooting in 20 seconds.. Fixes: 56a1485 ("i2c: npcm7xx: Add Nuvoton NPCM I2C controller driver") Signed-off-by: Tyrone Ting <kfting@nuvoton.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.8+ Reviewed-by: Tali Perry <tali.perry1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250220040029.27596-2-kfting@nuvoton.com

Commit <d74169ceb0d2> ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts locally") moved the call to enable_drhd_fault_handling() to a code path that does not hold any lock while traversing the drhd list. Fix it by ensuring the dmar_global_lock lock is held when traversing the drhd list. Without this fix, the following warning is triggered: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.14.0-rc3 torvalds#55 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:2046 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by cpuhp/1/23: #0: ffffffff84a67c50 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0 #1: ffffffff84a6a380 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3 torvalds#55 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xd0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x159/0x1f0 ? __pfx_enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x10/0x10 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x151/0x180 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1df/0x990 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x1ea/0x2c0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x1f5/0x2e0 ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x12a/0x2d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Holding the lock in enable_drhd_fault_handling() triggers a lockdep splat about a possible deadlock between dmar_global_lock and cpu_hotplug_lock. This is avoided by not holding dmar_global_lock when calling iommu_device_register(), which initiates the device probe process. Fixes: d74169c ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts locally") Reported-and-tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/Zx9OwdLIc_VoQ0-a@shredder.mtl.com/ Tested-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250218022422.2315082-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>

syzbot is able to crash hosts [1], using llc and devices not supporting IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING. In this case, e1000 driver calls eth_skb_pad(), while the skb is shared. Simply replace skb_get() by skb_clone() in net/llc/llc_s_ac.c Note that e1000 driver might have an issue with pktgen, because it does not clear IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING, this is an orthogonal change. We need to audit other skb_get() uses in net/llc. [1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2178 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16371 Comm: syz.2.2764 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4-syzkaller-00052-gac9c34d1e45a #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0x6ce/0x1240 net/core/skbuff.c:2178 Call Trace: <TASK> __skb_pad+0x18a/0x610 net/core/skbuff.c:2466 __skb_put_padto include/linux/skbuff.h:3843 [inline] skb_put_padto include/linux/skbuff.h:3862 [inline] eth_skb_pad include/linux/etherdevice.h:656 [inline] e1000_xmit_frame+0x2d99/0x5800 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3128 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5151 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5160 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3806 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9a/0x7b0 net/core/dev.c:3822 sch_direct_xmit+0x1ae/0xc30 net/sched/sch_generic.c:343 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4045 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13d4/0x43e0 net/core/dev.c:4621 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3313 [inline] llc_sap_action_send_test_c+0x268/0x320 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:144 llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline] llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline] llc_sap_state_process+0x239/0x510 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209 llc_ui_sendmsg+0xd0d/0x14e0 net/llc/af_llc.c:993 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot+da65c993ae113742a25f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67c020c0.050a0220.222324.0011.GAE@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The bnxt_queue_mem_alloc() is called to allocate new queue memory when a queue is restarted. It internally accesses rx buffer descriptor corresponding to the index. The rx buffer descriptor is allocated and set when the interface is up and it's freed when the interface is down. So, if queue is restarted if interface is down, kernel panic occurs. Splat looks like: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000000b240 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1563 Comm: ncdevmem2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ torvalds#9 844ddba6e7c459cafd0bf4db9a3198e Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021 RIP: 0010:bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x3f/0x4e0 [bnxt_en] Code: 41 54 4d 89 c4 4d 69 c0 c0 05 00 00 55 48 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 4c 8d b5 40 05 00 00 48 83 ec 15 RSP: 0018:ffff9dcc83fef9e8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffffffffc0457720 RBX: ffff934ed8d40000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: ffff934ea508f800 RDI: ffff934ea508f808 RBP: ffff934ea508f800 R08: 000000000000b240 R09: ffff934e84f4b000 R10: ffff9dcc83fefa30 R11: ffff934e84f4b000 R12: 000000000000001f R13: ffff934ed8d40ac0 R14: ffff934ea508fd40 R15: ffff934e84f4b000 FS: 00007fa73888c740(0000) GS:ffff93559f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000b240 CR3: 0000000145a2e000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x460 ? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? __pfx_bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 7f85e76f4d724ba07471d7e39d9e773aea6597b7] ? bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x3f/0x4e0 [bnxt_en 7f85e76f4d724ba07471d7e39d9e773aea6597b7] netdev_rx_queue_restart+0xc5/0x240 net_devmem_bind_dmabuf_to_queue+0xf8/0x200 netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit+0x3a7/0x450 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd9/0x130 genl_rcv_msg+0x184/0x2b0 ? __pfx_netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 ... Reviewed-by: Somnath Kotur <somnath.kotur@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Fixes: 2d694c2 ("bnxt_en: implement netdev_queue_mgmt_ops") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250309134219.91670-3-ap420073@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When qstats-get operation is executed, callbacks of netdev_stats_ops are called. The bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx} collect per-queue stats from sw_stats in the rings. But {rx | tx | cp}_ring are allocated when the interface is up. So, these rings are not allocated when the interface is down. The qstats-get is allowed even if the interface is down. However, the bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx}() accesses cp_ring and tx_ring without null check. So, it needs to avoid accessing rings if the interface is down. Reproducer: ip link set $interface down ./cli.py --spec netdev.yaml --dump qstats-get OR ip link set $interface down python ./stats.py Splat looks like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1680fa067 P4D 1680fa067 PUD 16be3b067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1495 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4+ torvalds#32 5cd0f999d5a15c574ac72b3e4b907341 Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021 RIP: 0010:bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en] Code: c6 87 b5 18 00 00 02 eb a2 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 01 RSP: 0018:ffffabef43cdb7e0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc04c8710 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffabef43cdb858 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8d504e850000 RBP: ffff8d506c9f9c00 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffff8d506bcd901c R10: 0000000000000015 R11: ffff8d506bcd9000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffabef43cdb8c0 R14: ffff8d504e850000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f2c5462b080(0000) GS:ffff8d575f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000167fd0000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x460 ? sched_balance_find_src_group+0x58d/0xd10 ? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en cdd546fd48563c280cfd30e9647efa420db07bf1] netdev_nl_stats_by_netdev+0x2b1/0x4e0 ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0 ? xas_find+0x183/0x1d0 ? xa_find+0x8b/0xe0 netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0xbf/0x1e0 genl_dumpit+0x31/0x90 netlink_dump+0x1a8/0x360 Fixes: af7b3b4 ("eth: bnxt: support per-queue statistics") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Somnath Kotur <somnath.kotur@broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250309134219.91670-6-ap420073@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

A blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the integrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when adding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading when traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event. In case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive notifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired twice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1]. Specifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a SWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications about deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process(). Fix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification chain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect the chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain. Events are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in call_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in the future. Maintain the "blocking" prefix as events are always emitted from process context and listeners are allowed to block. [1]: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- ip/52731 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem); lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by ip/52731: #0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0 #1: ffffffff8731f628 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0 #2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 stack backtrace: ... ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340 switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0 switchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340 br_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge] br_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge] notifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0 switchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0 ... Fixes: f7a70d6 ("net: bridge: switchdev: Ensure deferred event delivery on unoffload") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com> Tested-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250305121509.631207-1-amcohen@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

For the ACPI backend of UCSI the UCSI "registers" are just a memory copy of the register values in an opregion. The ACPI implementation in the BIOS ensures that the opregion contents are synced to the embedded controller and it ensures that the registers (in particular CCI) are synced back to the opregion on notifications. While there is an ACPI call that syncs the actual registers to the opregion there is rarely a need to do this and on some ACPI implementations it actually breaks in various interesting ways. The only reason to force a sync from the embedded controller is to poll CCI while notifications are disabled. Only the ucsi core knows if this is the case and guessing based on the current command is suboptimal, i.e. leading to the following spurious assertion splat: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 76 at drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c:1388 ucsi_reset_ppm+0x1b4/0x1c0 [typec_ucsi] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/3:0 Not tainted 6.12.11-200.fc41.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: LENOVO 21D0/LNVNB161216, BIOS J6CN45WW 03/17/2023 Workqueue: events_long ucsi_init_work [typec_ucsi] RIP: 0010:ucsi_reset_ppm+0x1b4/0x1c0 [typec_ucsi] Call Trace: <TASK> ucsi_init_work+0x3c/0xac0 [typec_ucsi] process_one_work+0x179/0x330 worker_thread+0x252/0x390 kthread+0xd2/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Thus introduce a ->poll_cci() method that works like ->read_cci() with an additional forced sync and document that this should be used when polling with notifications disabled. For all other backends that presumably don't have this issue use the same implementation for both methods. Fixes: fa48d7e ("usb: typec: ucsi: Do not call ACPI _DSM method for UCSI read operations") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt <lk@c--e.de> Tested-by: Fedor Pchelkin <boddah8794@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <boddah8794@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217105442.113486-2-boddah8794@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Devices created through binderfs are added to the global binder_devices list but are not removed before being destroyed. This leads to dangling pointers in the list and subsequent use-after-free errors: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_add_device+0x5c/0x9c Write of size 8 at addr ffff0000c258d708 by task mount/653 CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 653 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.13.0-09030-g6d61a53dd6f5 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_add_device+0x5c/0x9c binderfs_binder_device_create+0x690/0x84c [...] __arm64_sys_mount+0x324/0x3bc Allocated by task 632: binderfs_binder_device_create+0x168/0x84c binder_ctl_ioctl+0xfc/0x184 [...] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x110/0x150 Freed by task 649: kfree+0xe0/0x338 binderfs_evict_inode+0x138/0x1dc [...] ================================================================== Remove devices from binder_devices before destroying them. Cc: Li Li <dualli@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+7015dcf45953112c8b45@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7015dcf45953112c8b45 Fixes: 12d909c ("binderfs: add new binder devices to binder_devices") Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Tested-by: syzbot+7015dcf45953112c8b45@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130215823.1518990-1-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

nvme_tcp_poll() may race with the send path error handler because it may complete the request while it is actively being polled for completion, resulting in a UAF panic [1]: We should make sure to stop polling when we see an error when trying to read from the socket. Hence make sure to propagate the error so that the block layer breaks the polling cycle. [1]: -- [35665.692310] nvme nvme2: failed to send request -13 [35665.702265] nvme nvme2: unsupported pdu type (3) [35665.702272] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [35665.702542] nvme nvme2: queue 1 receive failed: -22 [35665.703209] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [35665.703213] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [35665.703214] PGD 8000003801cce067 P4D 8000003801cce067 PUD 37e6f79067 PMD 0 [35665.703220] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [35665.703658] nvme nvme2: starting error recovery [35665.705809] Hardware name: Inspur aaabbb/YZMB-00882-104, BIOS 4.1.26 09/22/2022 [35665.705812] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_requeue_work [35665.709172] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 [35665.715788] Call Trace: [35665.716201] <TASK> [35665.716613] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 [35665.717049] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 [35665.717457] ? blk_mq_request_bypass_insert+0x2c/0xb0 [35665.717950] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [35665.718361] ? page_fault_oops+0xac/0x140 [35665.718749] ? blk_mq_start_request+0x30/0xf0 [35665.719144] ? nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0xc7/0x170 [nvme_tcp] [35665.719547] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x130 [35665.719938] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [35665.720333] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 [35665.720723] blk_mq_request_bypass_insert+0x2c/0xb0 [35665.721101] blk_mq_requeue_work+0xa5/0x180 [35665.721451] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x390 [35665.721809] worker_thread+0x53/0x3d0 [35665.722159] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [35665.722501] kthread+0x124/0x150 [35665.722849] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [35665.723182] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Reported-by: Zhang Guanghui <zhang.guanghui@cestc.cn> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>

Currently kvfree_rcu() APIs use a system workqueue which is "system_unbound_wq" to driver RCU machinery to reclaim a memory. Recently, it has been noted that the following kernel warning can be observed: <snip> workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM nvme-wq:nvme_scan_work is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events_unbound:kfree_rcu_work WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 330 at kernel/workqueue.c:3719 check_flush_dependency+0x112/0x120 Modules linked in: intel_uncore_frequency(E) intel_uncore_frequency_common(E) skx_edac(E) ... CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 330 Comm: kworker/u144:6 Tainted: G E 6.13.2-0_g925d379822da #1 Hardware name: Wiwynn Twin Lakes MP/Twin Lakes Passive MP, BIOS YMM20 02/01/2023 Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x112/0x120 Code: 05 9a 40 14 02 01 48 81 c6 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 50 18 48 81 c7 c0 00 00 00 48 89 f9 48 ... RSP: 0018:ffffc90000df7bd8 EFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: 000000000000006a RBX: ffffffff81622390 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 00000000fffeffff RSI: 000000000057ffa8 RDI: ffff88907f960c88 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff83068e50 R09: 000000000002fffd R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881001a4400 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88907f420fb8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CR2: 00007f60c3001000 CR3: 000000107d010005 CR4: 00000000007726f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa4/0x140 ? check_flush_dependency+0x112/0x120 ? report_bug+0xe1/0x140 ? check_flush_dependency+0x112/0x120 ? handle_bug+0x5e/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? timer_recalc_next_expiry+0x190/0x190 ? check_flush_dependency+0x112/0x120 ? check_flush_dependency+0x112/0x120 __flush_work.llvm.1643880146586177030+0x174/0x2c0 flush_rcu_work+0x28/0x30 kvfree_rcu_barrier+0x12f/0x160 kmem_cache_destroy+0x18/0x120 bioset_exit+0x10c/0x150 disk_release.llvm.6740012984264378178+0x61/0xd0 device_release+0x4f/0x90 kobject_put+0x95/0x180 nvme_put_ns+0x23/0xc0 nvme_remove_invalid_namespaces+0xb3/0xd0 nvme_scan_work+0x342/0x490 process_scheduled_works+0x1a2/0x370 worker_thread+0x2ff/0x390 ? pwq_release_workfn+0x1e0/0x1e0 kthread+0xb1/0xe0 ? __kthread_parkme+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x40 ? __kthread_parkme+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- <snip> To address this switch to use of independent WQ_MEM_RECLAIM workqueue, so the rules are not violated from workqueue framework point of view. Apart of that, since kvfree_rcu() does reclaim memory it is worth to go with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM type of wq because it is designed for this purpose. Fixes: 6c6c47b ("mm, slab: call kvfree_rcu_barrier() from kmem_cache_destroy()"), Reported-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Z7iqJtCjHKfo8Kho@kbusch-mbp/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes <joelagnelf@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>

Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access. [ 4.239592] ============================= [ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f torvalds#35 Not tainted [ 4.239603] ----------------------------- [ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock: [ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this: [ 4.239643] context-{5:5} [ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76: [ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c [ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c [ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8 [ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value. [ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc [ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690 [ 4.264840] #4: [ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690 [ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee100000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz [ 4.304082] stack backtrace: [ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f torvalds#35 [ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) [ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 4.304106] Call trace: [ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C) [ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90 [ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584 [ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c [ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 [ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8 [ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178 [ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690 [ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190 [ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4 [ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries [ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0 [ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac [ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4 [ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440 [ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4 [ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78 [ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8 [ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8 [ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118 [ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160 [ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 [ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc [ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8 [ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c [ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250121135833.3769310-1-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>

Commit b15c872 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem. Warning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty torvalds#41 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c Call trace: try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P) try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L) rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8 rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58 try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90 unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8 do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568 offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670 memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374 memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78 device_offline+0xa4/0xd0 state_store+0x8c/0xf0 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8 vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250217014329.3610326-4-mawupeng1@huawei.com Fixes: b15c872 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined") Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Add a NULL check on the return value of swp_swap_info in __swap_duplicate to prevent crashes caused by NULL pointer dereference. The reason why swp_swap_info() returns NULL is unclear; it may be due to CPU cache issues or DDR bit flips. The probability of this issue is very small - it has been observed to occur approximately 1 in 500,000 times per week. The stack info we encountered is as follows: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058 [RB/E]rb_sreason_str_set: sreason_str set null_pointer Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000008a80e5000 [0000000000000058] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0 ... pc : swap_duplicate+0x44/0x164 lr : copy_page_range+0x508/0x1e78 sp : ffffffc0f2a699e0 x29: ffffffc0f2a699e0 x28: ffffff8a5b28d388 x27: ffffff8b06603388 x26: ffffffdf7291fe70 x25: 0000000000000006 x24: 0000000000100073 x23: 00000000002d2d2f x22: 0000000000000008 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 00000000002d2d2f x19: 18000000002d2d2f x18: ffffffdf726faec0 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0010000000000001 x15: 0040000000000001 x14: 0400000000000001 x13: ff7ffffffffffb7f x12: ffeffffffffffbff x11: ffffff8a5c7e1898 x10: 0000000000000018 x9 : 0000000000000006 x8 : 1800000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffff8057c01f10 x5 : 000000000000a318 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000006daf200000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 18000000002d2d2f Call trace: swap_duplicate+0x44/0x164 copy_page_range+0x508/0x1e78 copy_process+0x1278/0x21cc kernel_clone+0x90/0x438 __arm64_sys_clone+0x5c/0x8c invoke_syscall+0x58/0x110 do_el0_svc+0x8c/0xe0 el0_svc+0x38/0x9c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x44/0xec el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac Code: 9139c35a 71006f3f 54000568 f8797b55 (f9402ea8) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs The patch seems to only provide a workaround, but there are no more effective software solutions to handle the bit flips problem. This path will change the issue from a system crash to a process exception, thereby reducing the impact on the entire machine. akpm: this is probably a kernel bug, but this patch keeps the system running and doesn't reduce that bug's debuggability. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e223b0e6ba2f4924984b1917cc717bd5@honor.com Signed-off-by: gao xu <gaoxu2@honor.com> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

userfaultfd_move() checks whether the PTE entry is present or a swap entry. - If the PTE entry is present, move_present_pte() handles folio migration by setting: src_folio->index = linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr); - If the PTE entry is a swap entry, move_swap_pte() simply copies the PTE to the new dst_addr. This approach is incorrect because, even if the PTE is a swap entry, it can still reference a folio that remains in the swap cache. This creates a race window between steps 2 and 4. 1. add_to_swap: The folio is added to the swapcache. 2. try_to_unmap: PTEs are converted to swap entries. 3. pageout: The folio is written back. 4. Swapcache is cleared. If userfaultfd_move() occurs in the window between steps 2 and 4, after the swap PTE has been moved to the destination, accessing the destination triggers do_swap_page(), which may locate the folio in the swapcache. However, since the folio's index has not been updated to match the destination VMA, do_swap_page() will detect a mismatch. This can result in two critical issues depending on the system configuration. If KSM is disabled, both small and large folios can trigger a BUG during the add_rmap operation due to: page_pgoff(folio, page) != linear_page_index(vma, address) [ 13.336953] page: refcount:6 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000f43db19c index:0xffffaf150 pfn:0x4667c [ 13.337520] head: order:2 mapcount:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:1 pincount:0 [ 13.337716] memcg:ffff00000405f000 [ 13.337849] anon flags: 0x3fffc0000020459(locked|uptodate|dirty|owner_priv_1|head|swapbacked|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff) [ 13.338630] raw: 03fffc0000020459 ffff80008507b538 ffff80008507b538 ffff000006260361 [ 13.338831] raw: 0000000ffffaf150 0000000000004000 0000000600000000 ffff00000405f000 [ 13.339031] head: 03fffc0000020459 ffff80008507b538 ffff80008507b538 ffff000006260361 [ 13.339204] head: 0000000ffffaf150 0000000000004000 0000000600000000 ffff00000405f000 [ 13.339375] head: 03fffc0000000202 fffffdffc0199f01 ffffffff00000000 0000000000000001 [ 13.339546] head: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 13.339736] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_pgoff(folio, page) != linear_page_index(vma, address)) [ 13.340190] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 13.340316] kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1380! [ 13.340683] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 13.340969] Modules linked in: [ 13.341257] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 107 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-gcf42737e247a-dirty torvalds#299 [ 13.341470] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 13.341671] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 13.341815] pc : __page_check_anon_rmap+0xa0/0xb0 [ 13.341920] lr : __page_check_anon_rmap+0xa0/0xb0 [ 13.342018] sp : ffff80008752bb20 [ 13.342093] x29: ffff80008752bb20 x28: fffffdffc0199f00 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 13.342404] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000001 [ 13.342575] x23: 0000ffffaf0d0000 x22: 0000ffffaf0d0000 x21: fffffdffc0199f00 [ 13.342731] x20: fffffdffc0199f00 x19: ffff000006210700 x18: 00000000ffffffff [ 13.342881] x17: 6c203d2120296567 x16: 6170202c6f696c6f x15: 662866666f67705f [ 13.343033] x14: 6567617028454741 x13: 2929737365726464 x12: ffff800083728ab0 [ 13.343183] x11: ffff800082996bf8 x10: 0000000000000fd7 x9 : ffff80008011bc40 [ 13.343351] x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : 00000000fffff000 x6 : ffff8000829eebf8 [ 13.343498] x5 : c0000000fffff000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 13.343645] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000062db980 x0 : 000000000000005f [ 13.343876] Call trace: [ 13.344045] __page_check_anon_rmap+0xa0/0xb0 (P) [ 13.344234] folio_add_anon_rmap_ptes+0x22c/0x320 [ 13.344333] do_swap_page+0x1060/0x1400 [ 13.344417] __handle_mm_fault+0x61c/0xbc8 [ 13.344504] handle_mm_fault+0xd8/0x2e8 [ 13.344586] do_page_fault+0x20c/0x770 [ 13.344673] do_translation_fault+0xb4/0xf0 [ 13.344759] do_mem_abort+0x48/0xa0 [ 13.344842] el0_da+0x58/0x130 [ 13.344914] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc4/0x138 [ 13.345002] el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 [ 13.345208] Code: aa1503e0 f000f801 910f6021 97ff5779 (d4210000) [ 13.345504] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 13.345715] note: a.out[107] exited with irqs disabled [ 13.345954] note: a.out[107] exited with preempt_count 2 If KSM is enabled, Peter Xu also discovered that do_swap_page() may trigger an unexpected CoW operation for small folios because ksm_might_need_to_copy() allocates a new folio when the folio index does not match linear_page_index(vma, addr). This patch also checks the swapcache when handling swap entries. If a match is found in the swapcache, it processes it similarly to a present PTE. However, there are some differences. For example, the folio is no longer exclusive because folio_try_share_anon_rmap_pte() is performed during unmapping. Furthermore, in the case of swapcache, the folio has already been unmapped, eliminating the risk of concurrent rmap walks and removing the need to acquire src_folio's anon_vma or lock. Note that for large folios, in the swapcache handling path, we directly return -EBUSY since split_folio() will return -EBUSY regardless if the folio is under writeback or unmapped. This is not an urgent issue, so a follow-up patch may address it separately. [v-songbaohua@oppo.com: minor cleanup according to Peter Xu] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250226024411.47092-1-21cnbao@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250226001400.9129-1-21cnbao@gmail.com Fixes: adef440 ("userfaultfd: UFFDIO_MOVE uABI") Signed-off-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com> Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Nicolas Geoffray <ngeoffray@google.com> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com> Cc: Tangquan Zheng <zhengtangquan@oppo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

With ltp test case "testcases/bin/hugefork02", there is a dmesg error report message such as: kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:5550! Oops - BUG[#1]: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1517 Comm: hugefork02 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ torvalds#241 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 pc 90000000004eaf1c ra 9000000000485538 tp 900000010edbc000 sp 900000010edbf940 a0 900000010edbfb00 a1 9000000108d20280 a2 00007fffe9474000 a3 00007ffff3474000 a4 0000000000000000 a5 0000000000000003 a6 00000000003cadd3 a7 0000000000000000 t0 0000000001ffffff t1 0000000001474000 t2 900000010ecd7900 t3 00007fffe9474000 t4 00007fffe9474000 t5 0000000000000040 t6 900000010edbfb00 t7 0000000000000001 t8 0000000000000005 u0 90000000004849d0 s9 900000010edbfa00 s0 9000000108d20280 s1 00007fffe9474000 s2 0000000002000000 s3 9000000108d20280 s4 9000000002b38b10 s5 900000010edbfb00 s6 00007ffff3474000 s7 0000000000000406 s8 900000010edbfa08 ra: 9000000000485538 unmap_vmas+0x130/0x218 ERA: 90000000004eaf1c __unmap_hugepage_range+0x6f4/0x7d0 PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0) PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000) Process hugefork02 (pid: 1517, threadinfo=00000000a670eaf4, task=000000007a95fc64) Call Trace: [<90000000004eaf1c>] __unmap_hugepage_range+0x6f4/0x7d0 [<9000000000485534>] unmap_vmas+0x12c/0x218 [<9000000000494068>] exit_mmap+0xe0/0x308 [<900000000025fdc4>] mmput+0x74/0x180 [<900000000026a284>] do_exit+0x294/0x898 [<900000000026aa30>] do_group_exit+0x30/0x98 [<900000000027bed4>] get_signal+0x83c/0x868 [<90000000002457b4>] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x54/0xfa0 [<90000000015795e8>] irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xb8/0x138 [<90000000002572d0>] tlb_do_page_fault_1+0x114/0x1b4 The problem is that base address allocated from hugetlbfs is not aligned with pmd size. Here add a checking for hugetlbfs and align base address with pmd size. After this patch the test case "testcases/bin/hugefork02" passes to run. This is similar to the commit 7f24cbc ("mm/mmap: teach generic_get_unmapped_area{_topdown} to handle hugetlb mappings"). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.13+ Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>

When removing LAG device from bridge, NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event is triggered. Driver finds the lower devices (PFs) to flush all the offloaded entries. And mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb is checked, it returns false if one of PF is unloaded. In such case, mlx5_esw_bridge_lag_rep_get() and its caller return NULL, instead of the alive PF, and the flush is skipped. Besides, the bridge fdb entry's lastuse is updated in mlx5 bridge event handler. But this SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE event can be ignored in this case because the upper interface for bond is deleted, and the entry will never be aged because lastuse is never updated. To make things worse, as the entry is alive, mlx5 bridge workqueue keeps sending that event, which is then handled by kernel bridge notifier. It causes the following crash when accessing the passed bond netdev which is already destroyed. To fix this issue, remove such checks. LAG state is already checked in commit 15f8f16 ("net/mlx5: Bridge, verify LAG state when adding bond to bridge"), driver still need to skip offload if LAG becomes invalid state after initialization. Oops: stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 23695 Comm: kworker/u40:3 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0_mlnx #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_bridge_wq mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge] Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 02 48 f7 00 00 02 00 00 74 69 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b a8 08 01 00 00 48 85 ed 74 4a 48 83 fe 02 48 89 d3 <4c> 8b 65 00 74 23 76 49 48 83 fe 05 74 7e 48 83 fe 06 75 2f 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffc900092cfda0 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: ffff888123bfe000 RBX: ffffc900092cfe08 RCX: 00000000ffffffff RDX: ffffc900092cfe08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0c585f0 RBP: 6669746f6e690a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888123ae92c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888123ae9c60 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc900092cfe08 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f15914c8734 CR3: 0000000002830005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60 ? die+0x38/0x60 ? do_trap+0x10b/0x120 ? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0 ? exc_stack_segment+0x33/0x50 ? asm_exc_stack_segment+0x22/0x30 ? br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge] ? sched_balance_newidle.isra.149+0x248/0x390 notifier_call_chain+0x4b/0xa0 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 mlx5_esw_bridge_update+0xec/0x170 [mlx5_core] mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x19/0x40 [mlx5_core] process_scheduled_works+0x81/0x390 worker_thread+0x106/0x250 ? bh_worker+0x110/0x110 kthread+0xb7/0xe0 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Fixes: ff9b752 ("net/mlx5: Bridge, support LAG") Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <jianbol@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1741644104-97767-6-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

When on a MANA VM hibernation is triggered, as part of hibernate_snapshot(), mana_gd_suspend() and mana_gd_resume() are called. If during this mana_gd_resume(), a failure occurs with HWC creation, mana_port_debugfs pointer does not get reinitialized and ends up pointing to older, cleaned-up dentry. Further in the hibernation path, as part of power_down(), mana_gd_shutdown() is triggered. This call, unaware of the failures in resume, tries to cleanup the already cleaned up mana_port_debugfs value and hits the following bug: [ 191.359296] mana 7870:00:00.0: Shutdown was called [ 191.359918] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ 191.360584] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 191.361125] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 191.361727] PGD 1080ea067 P4D 0 [ 191.362172] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 191.362606] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 1674 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ #2 [ 191.363292] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024 [ 191.364124] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x19/0x50 [ 191.364537] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb e8 de cd ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 13 75 16 65 48 8b 05 88 24 4c 6a 48 89 43 08 48 8b 5d [ 191.365867] RSP: 0000:ff45fbe0c1c037b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 191.366350] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000098 RCX: ffffff8100000000 [ 191.366951] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: 0000000000000098 [ 191.367600] RBP: ff45fbe0c1c037c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 191.368225] R10: ff45fbe0d2b01000 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 191.368874] R13: 000000000000000b R14: ff43dc27509d67c0 R15: 0000000000000020 [ 191.369549] FS: 00007dbc5001e740(0000) GS:ff43dc663f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 191.370213] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 191.370830] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 0000000168e8e002 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0 [ 191.371557] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 191.372192] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 191.372906] Call Trace: [ 191.373262] <TASK> [ 191.373621] ? show_regs+0x64/0x70 [ 191.374040] ? __die+0x24/0x70 [ 191.374468] ? page_fault_oops+0x290/0x5b0 [ 191.374875] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x448/0x800 [ 191.375357] ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x160 [ 191.375971] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [ 191.376416] ? down_write+0x19/0x50 [ 191.376832] ? down_write+0x12/0x50 [ 191.377232] simple_recursive_removal+0x4a/0x2a0 [ 191.377679] ? __pfx_remove_one+0x10/0x10 [ 191.378088] debugfs_remove+0x44/0x70 [ 191.378530] mana_detach+0x17c/0x4f0 [ 191.378950] ? __flush_work+0x1e2/0x3b0 [ 191.379362] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50 [ 191.379787] mana_remove+0xf2/0x1a0 [ 191.380193] mana_gd_shutdown+0x3b/0x70 [ 191.380642] pci_device_shutdown+0x3a/0x80 [ 191.381063] device_shutdown+0x13e/0x230 [ 191.381480] kernel_power_off+0x35/0x80 [ 191.381890] hibernate+0x3c6/0x470 [ 191.382312] state_store+0xcb/0xd0 [ 191.382734] kobj_attr_store+0x12/0x30 [ 191.383211] sysfs_kf_write+0x3e/0x50 [ 191.383640] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x140/0x1d0 [ 191.384106] vfs_write+0x271/0x440 [ 191.384521] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 191.384924] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20 [ 191.385313] x64_sys_call+0x2b0/0x20b0 [ 191.385736] do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150 [ 191.386146] ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xe7/0x240 [ 191.386676] ? __lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x79/0xb0 [ 191.387124] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10 [ 191.387515] ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 191.387937] ? do_anonymous_page+0x33c/0xa00 [ 191.388374] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcf3/0x1210 [ 191.388805] ? __count_memcg_events+0xbe/0x180 [ 191.389235] ? handle_mm_fault+0xae/0x300 [ 191.389588] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x559/0x800 [ 191.390027] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x43/0x230 [ 191.390525] ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30 [ 191.390879] ? exc_page_fault+0x86/0x160 [ 191.391235] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 191.391745] RIP: 0033:0x7dbc4ff1c574 [ 191.392111] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 [ 191.393412] RSP: 002b:00007ffd95a23ab8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 191.393990] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007dbc4ff1c574 [ 191.394594] RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 191.395215] RBP: 00007ffd95a23ae0 R08: 00007dbc50003b20 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 191.395805] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 [ 191.396404] R13: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 R14: 00007dbc500045c0 R15: 00007dbc50001ee0 [ 191.396987] </TASK> To fix this, we explicitly set such mana debugfs variables to NULL after debugfs_remove() is called. Fixes: 6607c17 ("net: mana: Enable debugfs files for MANA device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shradha Gupta <shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1741688260-28922-1-git-send-email-shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

…cal section A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: yzbot+ed801a886dfdbfe7136d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307232717.1759087-3-boqun.feng@gmail.com

We were still using the trans after the unlock, leading to this bug in the retry path: 00255 ------------[ cut here ]------------ 00255 kernel BUG at fs/bcachefs/btree_iter.c:3348! 00255 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP 00255 bcachefs (0ca38fe8-0a26-41f9-9b5d-6a27796c7803): /fiotest offset 86048768: no device to read from: 00255 u64s 8 type extent 4098:168192:U32_MAX len 128 ver 0: durability: 0 crc: c_size 128 size 128 offset 0 nonce 0 csum crc32c 0:8040a368 compress none ec: idx 83 block 1 ptr: 0:302:128 gen 0 00255 bcachefs (0ca38fe8-0a26-41f9-9b5d-6a27796c7803): /fiotest offset 85983232: no device to read from: 00255 u64s 8 type extent 4098:168064:U32_MAX len 128 ver 0: durability: 0 crc: c_size 128 size 128 offset 0 nonce 0 csum crc32c 0:43311336 compress none ec: idx 83 block 1 ptr: 0:302:0 gen 0 00255 Modules linked in: 00255 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 304 Comm: kworker/u70:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6-ktest-g526aae23d67d #16040 00255 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 00255 Workqueue: events_unbound bch2_rbio_retry 00255 pstate: 60001005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 00255 pc : __bch2_trans_get+0x100/0x378 00255 lr : __bch2_trans_get+0xa0/0x378 00255 sp : ffffff80c865b760 00255 x29: ffffff80c865b760 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff80d76ed880 00255 x26: 0000000000000018 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff80f4ec3760 00255 x23: ffffff80f4010140 x22: 0000000000000056 x21: ffffff80f4ec0000 00255 x20: ffffff80f4ec3788 x19: ffffff80d75f8000 x18: 00000000ffffffff 00255 x17: 2065707974203820 x16: 7334367520200a3a x15: 0000000000000008 00255 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000100 x12: 0000000000000006 00255 x11: ffffffc080b47a40 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffc08038dea8 00255 x8 : ffffff80d75fc018 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000003788 00255 x5 : 0000000000003760 x4 : ffffff80c922de80 x3 : ffffff80f18f0000 00255 x2 : ffffff80c922de80 x1 : 0000000000000130 x0 : 0000000000000006 00255 Call trace: 00255 __bch2_trans_get+0x100/0x378 (P) 00255 bch2_read_io_err+0x98/0x260 00255 bch2_read_endio+0xb8/0x2d0 00255 __bch2_read_extent+0xce8/0xfe0 00255 __bch2_read+0x2a8/0x978 00255 bch2_rbio_retry+0x188/0x318 00255 process_one_work+0x154/0x390 00255 worker_thread+0x20c/0x3b8 00255 kthread+0xf0/0x1b0 00255 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 00255 Code: 6b01001f 54ffff01 79408460 3617fec0 (d4210000) 00255 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 00255 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception 00255 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs 00255 Kernel Offset: disabled 00255 CPU features: 0x000,00000070,00000010,8240500b 00255 Memory Limit: none 00255 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception ]--- Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>

Fix race between rmmod and /proc/XXX's inode instantiation. The bug is that pde->proc_ops don't belong to /proc, it belongs to a module, therefore dereferencing it after /proc entry has been registered is a bug unless use_pde/unuse_pde() pair has been used. use_pde/unuse_pde can be avoided (2 atomic ops!) because pde->proc_ops never changes so information necessary for inode instantiation can be saved _before_ proc_register() in PDE itself and used later, avoiding pde->proc_ops->... dereference. rmmod lookup sys_delete_module proc_lookup_de pde_get(de); proc_get_inode(dir->i_sb, de); mod->exit() proc_remove remove_proc_subtree proc_entry_rundown(de); free_module(mod); if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) if (de->proc_ops->proc_read_iter) --> As module is already freed, will trigger UAF BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80a702b PGD 817fc4067 P4D 817fc4067 PUD 817fc0067 PMD 102ef4067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 2667 Comm: ls Tainted: G Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) RIP: 0010:proc_get_inode+0x302/0x6e0 RSP: 0018:ffff88811c837998 EFLAGS: 00010a06 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0538140 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 1ffffffff80a702b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc0538158 RBP: ffff8881299a6000 R08: 0000000067bbe1e5 R09: 1ffff11023906f20 R10: ffffffffb560ca07 R11: ffffffffb2b43a58 R12: ffff888105bb78f0 R13: ffff888100518048 R14: ffff8881299a6004 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f95b9686840(0000) GS:ffff8883af100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff80a702b CR3: 0000000117dd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> proc_lookup_de+0x11f/0x2e0 __lookup_slow+0x188/0x350 walk_component+0x2ab/0x4f0 path_lookupat+0x120/0x660 filename_lookup+0x1ce/0x560 vfs_statx+0xac/0x150 __do_sys_newstat+0x96/0x110 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [adobriyan@gmail.com: don't do 2 atomic ops on the common path] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3d25ded0-1739-447e-812b-e34da7990dcf@p183 Fixes: 778f3dd ("Fix procfs compat_ioctl regression") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

congwang added 2 commits November 20, 2024 14:16

Update skmsg.c

00d2561

Update skmsg.h

16fe69d

congwang merged commit 0acaa77 into bpf-next Nov 20, 2024

congwang deleted the congwang-patch-1 branch November 20, 2024 22:21

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Remove redundant work_backlog_mutex #1

Remove redundant work_backlog_mutex #1

congwang commented Nov 20, 2024

Remove redundant work_backlog_mutex #1

Remove redundant work_backlog_mutex #1

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congwang commented Nov 20, 2024